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Legislative Enforcement of
Equal Protection
Stephen F. Ross*
Should legislators evaluate the constitutionality of legislation? For too long, legislators have abdicated to the judiciary
their responsibility to enforce constitutional norms. This abdication of responsibility is particularly troubling in equal protection cases because courts often use a standard deferential to
legislative determinations to uphold statutes of questionable
constitutionality.
Suppose, for example, that a state legislature is considering
a bill that provides general state funding for public schools, but
excludes special funding for handicapped students because of
the high cost of such services. Is the legislature constitutionally
obligated to amend the bill so that it provides equal educational
opportunities to handicapped children?
Some may say that the United States Supreme Court suggested a negative answer to this question in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodiguez.1 In Rodriguez the
Court refused to declare education to be a fundamental right
and indicated that the courts would sustain a legislature's denial of equal education if rationally related to any legitimate
public purpose.2 It rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the vital role of education in a free society justified strict judicial
scrutiny of unequal funding in state public schools. 3 The Court
held that an asserted right's importance "does not determine
whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause."'4 In so holding,
however, the Court was heavily influenced by institutional con* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois. The author wishes
to give special thanks to Jesse Choper, Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Frank
Holleman, Kit Kinports, Deborah Merritt, John Nowak, Ronald Rotunda, and
Edward Weil for their time, effort, and detailed comments.

1. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
2. Id. at 33-35, 55.
3. Id. at 35.
4. Id. at 30.
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siderations, refusing to assume a legislative role for which it
lacked both authority and competence. 5 To avoid such a role,
the Supreme Court refused to authorize the judiciary to demand significant justifications for unequal educational funding.
Applying Rodriguez, a court would reject a constitutional
challenge to the hypothetical legislation denying equal educational services to handicapped students because saving money
satisfies the rational basis test. A legislature, however, would
not overstep institutional boundaries by concluding that education is a fundamental constitutional right. Thus, unlike the judiciary, a legislator cannot rely on institutional limitations to
6
reject a constitutional challenge to proposed legislation.
To use another example, suppose that Congress enacts a
welfare or retirement system that provides different classes of
beneficiaries with different levels of benefits. May a legislator-either out of genuine concern for equality or out of base
political motives-attack this proposal on constitutional
grounds, insisting that Congress treat similarly needy beneficiaries on an equal basis? Again, the courts would dismiss summarily a constitutional challenge to a congressionally
established welfare or retirement system. The Supreme Court
will sustain such statutory classifications if they have any ra7
tional relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.
Because such socioeconomic statutes are neither inherently
invidious nor restrictive of fundamental rights, the Supreme
Court reasons that Congress is the appropriate institution to
choose among solutions as "a necessary result of different institutional competences. ''8 Its view reflects an awareness that the
legislature is especially equipped to make difficult distinctions
among groups of people. 9 The Court's reasoning, however, can5. Id. at 31.
6. Although the United States Congress has not declared education to be
a fundamental constitutional right, it has attempted to ensure "that all handicapped children have available to them.., a free appropriate public education
which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs." Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(a), 89 Stat. 773, 774 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(c) (1982)).
7. See. e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) (upholding Supplemental Security Income exclusion); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (upholding denial of railroad retirement benefits); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (approving ceiling on Aid
to Families with Dependent Children).
8. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 230.
9. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314
(1976) (per curiam).
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not be used by the legislature to avoid a constitutional inquiry.
Two people may be equally entitled to benefits, but, as the
Supreme Court indicates, it is not for the courts to so declare.
In both of these situations, the Supreme Court decisions
should begin, not end, the legislative constitutional debate.
Legislators should not adopt wholesale the rational basis standard used by the courts to evaluate equal protection challenges.
Rather, they should test statutory classifications against different, stricter standards.
Legislators should reach their own conclusions about the
constitutionality of legislation for several reasons. One reason
is historical: the Madisonian view of three coequal branches of
government supports the principle that each branch is charged
with protecting the Constitution in its own deliberations.10 Another is textual: all legislators take an oath to support and de10. D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 47-48 (1966). James
Madison, as a member of the House of Representatives, acknowledged that "in
the ordinary course of Government .... the exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary." Yet Madison asserted that it was the
duty of the House, "so far as it depends upon us, to take care that the powers
of the Constitution be preserved." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
Many of the framers clearly believed that Congress would make its own determinations concerning a statute's constitutionality. See D. MORGAN, supra, at
45-98.
The prevailing view of those serving in early Congresses was that Congress, as an independent branch of government, had both an independent authority and duty to decide constitutional questions. Id. at 47. For example, an
1818 debate concerning the constitutionality of the House of Representatives's
broad exercise of the contempt power did not include a single suggestion that
the issue be reserved for the judiciary, although the matter was fully justiciable. Id. at 117. The House's action was subsequently upheld by the Supreme
Court in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
The turmoil of the Civil War coincided with a slight but significant shift in
the views of some members of Congress. Officers of the United States and of
each state are all required to swear present and future loyalty to the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. The Senate was considering legislation to
require, in addition, an oath of past loyalty. 12 Stat. 502 (1862). Several Senators challenged Congress's constitutional power to add to the oath. See CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2693, 2862 (1862) (remarks of Sen. Saulsbury); id.
at 2694 (remarks of Sen. Davis). Defending the bill, Senator Trumbull agreed
that Congress should not pass an unconstitutional law but argued for the provision's constitutionality by relying on judicial precedents. Id. at 2693. Trumbull's reliance on the judiciary indicates a shift away from complete
congressional independence in deciding constitutional questions.
By 1890 the first substantial inclination toward constitutional buck passing
was on record. An issue arose during consideration of the Sherman Antitrust
Act as to whether the commerce clause authorized Congress to enact such a
measure. A leading proponent of the bill stated that the only way to determine its constitutionality was to refer it to the Supreme Court. 21 CONG. REc.
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fend the Constitution.1 1 The most important argument,
however, is functional: deference to the courts on all constitutional matters would leave numerous challenges unaddressed
2608 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Washburn). At the time, however, such views remained relatively rare. D. MORGAN, supra, at 158.
The floodgates began to open during the crisis of the great depression,
when President Roosevelt's attempts to legislate a national recovery were met
with hostility by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 527-51 (1935) (striking down part of a federal law
regulating the poultry industry). A renewed attempt to aid the severely depressed coal industry was before Congress that same year. In an effort to
move the legislation out of subcommittee, President Roosevelt wrote to the
subcommittee chair, arguing that "the situation is so urgent and the benefits of
the legislation so evident that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the bill,
leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the ultimate question of constitutionality." See D. MORGAN, supra, at 424. Although this view had been held
by only a minority of Congress a half-century earlier, it had become the prevailing view by 1935. Id. at 179. Unfortunately, it seems to have commanded
substantial support ever since. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. S5305 (daily ed. May 3,
1984) (Senator Dixon's response to questions about the constitutionality of
line-item veto legislation: "[I]t is for the courts, not the Senate."); 100 CONG.
REC. 14,647 (1954) (Senator Javits recognized constitutional flaws in Communist Control Act of 1954, but urged passage to allow implementation to be
worked out by courts); D. MORGAN, supra, at 8 (approximately one-third of
congressional members in survey during early 1960s felt constitutional questions should be passed to courts).
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.3. The oath was intended "to harness the force
of conscience, even of religious conviction, to the maintenance of constitutional
safeguards." D. MORGAN, supra note 10, at 48; see also STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 375 (5th ed. 1891) ("The Congress, the executive, and the court must each for itself be guided by its own
interpretation of the Constitution."). President Jackson invoked the oath to
justify his veto of legislation rechartering the Bank of the United States.
Fisher, ConstitutionalInterpretationby Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REV.
707, 713 (1985). Members of Congress have repeatedly invoked the oath to justify their duty to legislate in conformance with the Constitution. See. e.g.,
Civil Rights-The President'sProgram, 1963: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciaryon S. 1731 and S. 1750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1963)
(statement of Sen. Ervin); Civil Rights-Public Accomodations: Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 248
(1963) (statement of Sen. Engle); The President'sProposalon the Middle East:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate
Committee on Armed Services on S.J Res. 19 and H.J.Res. 117, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 192 (1957) (statement of Sen. Ervin); id. at 300-01 (statement of Sen.
Morse); id. at 787 (statement of Sen. Fulbright); 130 CONG. REC. S5314 (daily
ed. May 3, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Gorton); id. at S5315 (remarks of Sen.
Bumpers); 104 CONG. REC. 18,681 (1958) (statement of Sen. Wiley); 103 CONG.
REC. 2528 (1957) (statement of Sen. Jenner); 83 CONG. REC. 2741 (1938) (remarks of Sen. Bailey); 79 CONG. REC. 13,772 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Tydings);
id. at 14,080 (remarks of Sen. King); 21 CONG. REc. 2463 (1890) (remarks of
Sen. Vest); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1965 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Williams); id. at
2007, 2154 (remarks of Rep. Livingston); id. at 2133 (remarks of Rep. Smith of
Md.).
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because the courts have devised doctrines that preclude judges
from deciding the constitutionality of many statutes.
This Article explores the legislative role in enforcing the
constitutional guarantee to equal protection. Part I describes
the underenforcement principle that explains the restrictive judicial exercise of authority in constitutional matters. The Article then focuses on Congress's role in examining issues relating
to the constitutional guarantee of equal protection that the
courts have chosen to underenforce. Part II analyzes relevant
constitutional provisions that may empower or limit congressional actions. Part III considers ways in which Congress can
address state violations of equal protection through directives
to the judiciary and through the legislative process. Part IV details how both federal and state legislators can implement equal
protection guarantees in everyday legislation.' 2 Finally, Part V
distinguishes between constitutionally motivated decision making and conscientious decision making within the legislature
and discusses the political implications of a legislative process
that directly addresses the constitutionality of equal protection
issues.
I.

JUDICIAL UNDERENFORCEMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS

A. SUPREME

COURT ANALYSIS OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS

Judges and scholars have continuously suggested limits on
the exercise of the judiciary's authority to strike down allegedly unconstitutional legislation.13 The Supreme Court has incorporated such limitations into its multitiered approach to
equal protection issues. Through sparing use of heightened
scrutiny and extensive application of the deferential rational
basis test, the Court has adopted a policy of underenforcing
equal protection issues:
In reviewing equal protection claims, the Supreme Court
carefully scrutinizes legislation that classifies people based on
12. The Article suggests several substantive tests which are more rigorous
than those presently used by the courts and which should be applied by legislators to assess the constitutionality of proposed legislation. See infra notes
147-72 and accompanying text.
13. In the nineteenth century, for example, Professor Thayer argued that
courts should overturn only manifest violations of the Constitution because
Congress, and not the courts, had been assigned the "primary authority to interpret" the Constitution. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 136 (1893).
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suspect traits or that involves the exercise of fundamental
rights. 14 Because the Court requires that challenged classifications be necessary to fulfill a compelling state interest, 15 few
statutes survive this strict scrutiny test.16 Among the myriad

17
traits legislatures use to classify people, however, only race
and national origin18 invariably trigger strict scrutiny. 19 The
Court employs a middle tier of heightened, but less strict, scrutiny for gender 20 and illegitimacy. 21 The Court has declined,
however, to apply heightened judicial scrutiny to the poor,2 2 to
24
those over age fifty,23 and to the mentally retarded.

The Court has used strict scrutiny to invalidate laws bur14. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).
15. See, e.g., id.; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972).
16. Professor Gunther characterized the Court's use of close scrutiny as
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).

17. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (no overriding
purpose for racial classification in criminal statute).
18. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (public
necessity in war situation justified Japanese exclusion order).
19. Statutes discriminating on the basis of religious belief would also appear to qualify for strict equal protection scrutiny. The courts, however, do
not need to reach the equal protection issue to dispose of the controversy because they normally review such statutes under the first amendment's free exercise clause. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
The Court's treatment of alienage has been inconsistent. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) ("[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject
to close judicial scrutiny.") (footnotes omitted) with Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982) (strict scrutiny not appropriate when alienage is a
basis for exclusion from political rather than economic participation). See
Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REv. 51, 52 (1985) (Justice Blackmun remained
consistent "even while the coalition of Justices that has voted with him has
gradually eroded").
20. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 204 (1976) (gender classification for sale of beer does not further important governmental objective).
21. See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983) ("[S]tatutory classifications based on illegitimacy [are subject] to a heightened level of scrutiny.");
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (invidious to discriminate against illegitimate children).
22. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (denial of Medicaid funds to
indigent women for most abortions); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (unequal allocation of state public school funds).
23. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976)
(per curiam) (mandatory retirement at age 50).
24. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985)
(finding no rational basis for requirement of special use permit for group
homes of mentally retarded). But see id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in

19871

LEGISLATIVE EQUAL PROTECTION

dening fundamental rights such as interstate travel,25 voting,26
and picketing, 27 but has expressly refused to limit discrimination concerning subsistence income, 28 housing, 29 education, 30
and government employment. 31 Unless a right is "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, '32 the Court will not
apply the strict scrutiny test to a statutory classification that
impairs that right.
In addition to narrowly defining the groups and rights subject to heightened scrutiny, the Supreme Court has made it exceedingly difficult to prove the existence of discrimination if
the challenged statute is facially neutral. In Washington v.
Davis3 3 the Court held that without a showing of improper motive, it would apply minimal scrutiny to a statute with a disproportionate racial impact.34 Fearing that strict judicial scrutiny
"would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of ... statutes," the Court stated that "extension
of [strict scrutiny] beyond those areas where it is already applicable by reason of statute . . . should await legislative
'35
prescription.
part and dissenting in part) (Court actually applied a more exacting standard
than rational basis).
25. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (one-year residency requirement for public assistance eligibility).
26. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-37 (1972) (three-month residency requirement for voting eligibility).
27. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972) (picketing
near schools prohibited unless related to labor dispute).
28. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (no constitutional authority to "second-guess state officials charged with... allocating limited public welfare funds among... potential recipients").
29. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (no strict scrutiny of special
summary judicial procedure for tenant eviction).
30. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (no
constitutional right to acquire more than "basic minimal skills").
31. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)
(per curiam) (mandatory retirement).
32. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34.
33. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
34. Id. at 242 (employment screening test disproportionately excluded
blacks); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (racial imbalance in school enrollment); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (rezoning denial for low- and
moderate-income housing).
35. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. The decision was previewed five
years earlier in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), in which the Court
refused to apply strict judicial scrutiny to a welfare benefits plan that discriminated among classes of recipients. In addressing the disproportionate percentage of racial minorities within the disadvantaged class, the Court wrote:
The acceptance of appellants' constitutional theory would render sus-
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The Supreme Court's subsequent treatment of this issue
demonstrates that this holding is part of a larger judicial policy
to underenforce those rights that the Court feels institutionally
incapable of addressing. In Washington v. Davis the Court refused to invalidate, as violative of equal protection, a facially
neutral employment screening test that disproportionately disadvantaged blacks.36 Yet in Dothard v. Rawlinson,37 decided
the following year under title VII of the Civil Rights Act,38 the
Court struck down a facially neutral test because of its disproportionately adverse impact on women. 39 The only material
difference between the two cases was the congressional approval of disproportionate impact as proof of discrimination40
legislative enforcement of equal protection norms.
The Court's perception of itself as an unelected body in a
democratic society has doubtlessly influenced its refusal to expect each difference in treatment among the grant classes, however
lacking in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the treatment might be. Few legislative efforts to deal with the difficult
problems posed by current welfare programs could survive such scrutiny, and we do not find it required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 548-49; see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75 n.22 (1980) (rejecting a discriminatory impact standard for constitutionally based voting
rights challenges founded on "sociological considerations" because of doubts
that such considerations "could, in any principled manner, exclude the claims
of any discrete political group that happens.., to elect fewer of its candidates
than arithmetic indicates it might").
36. 426 U.S. at 246. Without a showing of discriminatory intent, the employment screening test used by the Washington, D.C., Police Department was
valid despite its disproportionate, detrimental impact on black candidates. The
Court noted that title VII of the Civil Rights Act did not require proof of discriminatory purpose, but the plaintiffs had failed to amend their complaint to
include such a claim after Congress extended title VII's coverage to public employees. Id. at 238 n.10, 246-47. The Court refused to apply the "more rigorous
standard" of title VII to this purely constitutional challenge. Id. at 247-48.
37. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Title VII does not require proof of improper
motive. It provides for active judicial scrutiny of racially disproportionate effects. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
39. Dothard,433 U.S. at 329-31.
40. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-53 (1976) (in discussing title
VII authorization of money damages against state governments, Court found
factual differences between cases not material and congressional authorization
dispositive). Compare also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (Court rejected equal protection challenge
to city zoning decision without proof of discriminatory intent) with Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th
Cir. 1977) (court, on remand, relied on Fair Housing Act to sustain challenge),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
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pand strict scrutiny beyond these narrow limits. 41 The history
of the fourteenth amendment clearly supports a ban on racial
discrimination, 4 2 however, and little judicial activism is needed
to extend judicial contempt for racial distinctions to discrimination based on race's cousin, national origin. Similarly, a limited
and logical corollary to Court preclusion of direct state infringement upon constitutionally guaranteed rights is a prohibition on state discrimination against a class of persons exercising
those same rights.43 These limited applications of the strict
scrutiny test indicate the Court's conservative view of its own
institutional role in equal protection issues.
When the Court determines that the equal protection
claims at issue do not warrant heightened scrutiny, it uses a rational basis test. In its most deferential form, the rational basis
test precludes meaningful judicial scrutiny of the challenged
statutory classification. 44 Courts show great deference to the
legislature's judgment that the statute is legitimate, upholding
a statute whose means and ends serve any conceivable public
purpose. 45 Under the rational basis test, the judiciary will not
41. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986) (expressing similar concerns about creation of fundamental rights under due process clause).
42. See generally J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956) (detailed study of the amendment's evolution prior to enactment);
H. MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1977) (history of enactment and analysis of subsequent "judicial erosion").

43. Some commentators argue that the fundamental rights prong of strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause is nonsensical, and that constitutional analysis would be improved if such cases were viewed solely as alleged
violations of the constitutional right at issue. See, e.g., Westen, The Empty Idea
of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 560-63 (1982). Even if this view were correct, Congress could nevertheless use its due process enforcement power
under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to protect those rights that the
Supreme Court declines to hold fundamental. For a discussion of Congress's
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment, see infra text accompanying
notes 70-90.
44. For most of this century, Supreme Court Justices have disputed the
proper articulation of the rational basis test. See generally Choper, Economic
and Social Regulations and Equal Protection,in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L.
TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT:

TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980-81, at 3-18

(1982) (discussing various formulations used by the Court). Compare United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (judicial inquiry
stops once plausible, hypothetical reason for statute appears) with Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 442 (1982) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)
("connection between means and ends need not be precise, [but] it . .. must
have some objective basis"). Even the Blackmun formulation-requiring some
objective basis-is far from a de novo review. Thus, even vigorous formulations do not end judicial underenforcement of equality norms.
45. See, e.g., Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179 ("[I]f there are plausible reasons for
Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end."); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
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investigate whether the asserted public purpose was in fact the
legislature's true objective or whether other means could better
achieve the desired ends. 46 These questions are left to the legislative process.
420, 425-26 (1961) (statutory discrimination not to be overturned if any set of
facts reasonably justifies it); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,
78-79 (1911) ("One who assails the classification ... must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis .... ").
46. Oregon Supreme Court Justice Linde, while a professor, sharply criticized the rational basis test. If the test were taken seriously, he wrote, it
would turn courts into "lunacy commissions sitting in judgment upon the
mental capacity of legislators." Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L.
REV. 197, 208 (1976) (quoting Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 819 (1935)). Linde concluded that the
only real constitutional question was "whether the aim of the law is out of
bounds, not whether it will miss its target-a question of legitimacy, not of rationality." Id. at 212.
A number of scholars, however, have presented forceful critiques of the
rational basis test that recommend a more rigorous standard of judicial review
for classifications not subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-30 (1978); Gunther, supra note 16, at 20-48. Legislatures remain entitled to a great deal of deference even under more rigorous
standards-power that this Article argues should be carefully and constitutionally administered by the legislators themselves.
Professor Tribe advocated that courts not accept justifications for a challenged statutory classification if they believe that the state is offering a post
hoc justification not actually considered by the legislature. L. TRIBE, supra, at
1085-86. Although this step may be desirable, see infra note 112 and accompanying text, it also highlights the institutional incapability of judges to divine
the true intent of legislatures. Thus, even if this proposal were accepted,
courts cannot protect equality norms fully because they cannot possibly determine true legislative intent.
Professor Gunther, on the other hand, advocated closer judicial scrutiny of
whether the means chosen by a legislature substantially further its ends. Gunther, supra note 16, at 20. He conceded, however, that limitations on judicial
competence impose a barrier to his proposal in a variety of contexts, such as in
the design of a welfare program. In such cases Gunther would have the Court
essentially abstain and defer to the legislature, just as it does under current
doctrine. Id. at 23-24.
Justice Stevens, setting forth his own approach to equal protection review,
rejected the traditional two- or three-tiered approach in favor of one that applies "a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion." Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). Among the factors Justice
Stevens looks at in determining whether a classification meets the requirements of the equal protection clause is whether "an impartial lawmaker could
logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose
that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class." City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). Even if this standard were adopted by the courts, it would constitute
a milder but no less real form of abstention and deference to the legislature.
Merely because an impartial legislator could find that a classification meets
Justice Stevens's test does not mean that the lawmakers actually did apply
and follow that test.
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RATIONALE FOR UNDERENFORCEMENT

The Court's lenient review under the rational basis test
and limited use of heightened scrutiny in the equal protection
area exemplify what Professor Sager calls judicial underenforcement of the Constitution. 47 Sager distinguished between two methods used by the Court to examine and
ultimately to uphold challenged statutes. Under one method
the Court independently analyzes the statute, upholding it because the Court believes that the statute does not violate any
constitutional principles. 48 Under the second method, the
Court upholds the statute because it believes that its institudeference to the popular will
tional competence or role requires
49
as expressed by the legislature.
The self-imposed limitations on the use of heightened scrutiny conform to Sager's second mode of judicial constitutional
analysis. In many cases the Court rejects such scrutiny without
making an independent determination that the challenged statute meets equality norms. Instead, heightened scrutiny is rejected because the Court believes that an unelected judiciary
lacks a principled way to identify new suspect traits or fundamental rights 50 and because of an unwillingness to balance
nonfundamental rights against legitimate state objectives. 5 1
47. See Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1215-16 (1978).
48. For example, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), the
Court sustained a part of a statute prohibiting contributions by a single individual of more than $1000 to a candidate for federal office. The Court closely
examined the purposes behind the statute and found that the reduction of actual and apparent corruption justified the restriction on first amendment freedoms. Id at 23-35. The discussion was void of legislative findings or language
indicating deference to Congress. See id.
49. See Sager, supra note 47, at 1217-18.
50. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(doubts over judiciary's ability to distinguish effects of social policies led Court
to require that fundamental rights be explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution).
51. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985). Although litigators could have used Sager's underenforcement theory
to argue against plenary Supreme Court review of state judicial decisions that
impose stricter constitutional standards than those imposed by the federal
courts, see Sager, supra note 47, at 1247-50, the Supreme Court has rejected
this argument. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 462
n.6 (1981) (state court applications of the fourteenth amendment fully reviewable).
Nevertheless, the Court's requirement that both state and federal courts
use one constitutional standard does not suggest that members of Congress or
state legislators must employ the same standard. As a general matter, legisla-
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Federal court rulings applying the rational basis test and
rejecting equal protection challenges to state legislation exemplify Sager's second method of examining constitutional challenges. The Supreme Court has proclaimed that the equal
protection clause mandates that all people similarly circumstanced be treated alike,52 but it underenforces that norm when
it declares that "[s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it." '5 3 Thus, whenever the Court applies
the rational basis test, it is underenforcing the equal protection
clause. 54 Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall noted:
[Tihis limitation on judicial review of state legislative classifications is
a limitation stemming, not from the Fourteenth Amendment itself,
but from the nature of judicial review. It is simply a "salutary princitors frequently face election and include among their members persons of varying backgrounds and expertise. In addition, legislators use a system of
decision making that permits the simultaneous consideration of varying proposals, thus accommodating diverse social, economic, and political interests. In
contrast, regardless of their method of selection, state judges decide constitutional issues in the narrow context of litigation, a context that does not facilitate the type of interest balancing necessary to evaluate most legislative
classifications.
52. See, e.g., Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 439; Plyler, 457 U.S. at
216; F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1887); see also Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949) (Constitution, in its
concern for equality, requires that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated). See generally 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.2, at 318 (1986) (same).
In contrast to these judicial and scholarly pronouncements, scholars of the
interpretivist school argue that the equal protection clause means only what
its drafters in the 39th Congress intended it to mean: blacks should be afforded the specified civil rights enjoyed by whites. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

169-76 (1977). If this theory were adopted, constitutional norms could not be
underenforced. The judiciary would strike down any law that interfered with
the enjoyment by blacks of the enumerated rights afforded to whites but
would uphold all other statutory classifications under the fourteenth amendment.
This Article does not attempt to resolve the debate between interpretivists
and noninterpretivists. It assumes that the Supreme Court's exposition of the
broad goal of equality reflects the actual constitutional norms of equality.
53. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
54. Recent cases demonstrate that use of the rational basis test constitutes
judicial underenforcement of the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Plyler, 457
U.S. at 216 (rational basis test reflects Court's decision to grant the legislature
initial discretion to determine what is different and what is the same, a discretion that will not be disturbed in most cases).
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ple of judicial decision," one of the "self-imposed restraints intended
to protect [the Court] and the state
against irresponsible exercise of
55
[the Court's unappealable power."

Proponents justify underenforcement, evidenced by the extensive use of the rational basis test and limited application of
heightened scrutiny, in two ways. They argue that in a democratic republic, unelected judges should tread carefully before
overruling the judgments of elected representatives. 56 In addition, federal courts lack the institutional competence to prescribe a workable standard that faithfully administers the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection mandate across the
57
breadth of governmental activity.
These justifications are important because all statutes
classify and discriminate to some degree. Thus, statutes tend to
be either overbroad, including within a classification people
who should be excluded, or underinclusive, excluding people
who ought to be included. 55 If the judiciary were to rigidly apply the norm that statutes must treat equally all those similarly
situated, it would have to invalidate most statutes. Short of
such an untenable result, courts would have to evaluate a host
of facts and policies in every determination of overbreadth or
underinclusiveness. Politically responsive officials are in a better position to make such evaluations. Because courts are less
able to weigh facts and policies in a principled manner, they
59
should abstain and defer to the legislature.
55. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247 (1970) (brackets in original) (citation omitted).
56. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979). "The Constitution
presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democractic process and that judicial
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think
a political branch has acted." Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
57. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 3031 (1973) (Court not competent to assume legislative role).
58. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 52, at 347-49.
59. As Professor Wechsler has eloquently stated, "[T]he main constituent
of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting
with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis
and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved." Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15
(1959). Even constitutional theorists with widely divergent views on the
proper degree of judicial activism agree on this fundamental point. See A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 23-28 (1962) (courts have capacity to

deal with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess);
M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 26-28 (1982)
(courts' explanations must have force apart from the result reached in the narrow circumstances of a single case). Although legislatures make determinations that are principled in the sense of being intellectually honest, their
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These arguments for some form of judicial deference and
underenforcement of equal protection norms resemble the rationale for nonjusticiable political questions. Under the political question doctrine, courts refrain from deciding questions
more properly decided by the other branches of government. 60
As set out by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,61 the judiciary will decline to decide an otherwise legitimate case or controversy 62 if it finds "a lack of judicially discoverable and
determinations do not automatically satisfy Wechsler's definition of principled.
Rather, most legislation requires such a delicate balancing of conflicting interests that, for example, the issue of who is similarly situated is inseparable
from the immediate result that the legislation achieves. The judiciary refers
the issue back to the legislature because these cases do not involve enduring
principles.
The underenforcement thesis recognizes that an institutional difference
between courts and legislatures renders the former less capable of engaging in
decision making unbounded by principles, as defined by Wechsler. To the extent that one rejects Wechsler's view of the limitations on courts, the underenforcement thesis has little application.
60. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-17 (1962) (reviewing political
question cases); see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939) (timeliness of state ratification of constitutional amendment); Luther v. Borden, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 1, 40-41 (1849) (choice between rival regimes as lawful government of Rhode Island); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (executive authorization of military assistance to El Salvador absent congressional declaration of war), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has developed a variant
on both the political question and standing doctrines, referred to as the doctrine of equitable discretion. Pursuant to this doctrine, a court will refuse to
rule on constitutional issues presented by members of Congress when the
members could obtain substantial relief through legislative action. See, e.g.,
Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (dismissing challenge to tax legislation based on the origination clause in
article I); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1175-77 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (dismissing challenge to partisan makeup of committees of the House of Representatives based on several constitutional provisions); Riegle v. Federal Open
Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dismissing challenge to
makeup of body that determines nation's money supply based on the appointments clause of article II).
Professor Henkin argued that a political question doctrine does not exist.
Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
Yet, accounting for the Court's holding in Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon,
223 U.S. 118 (1912), he conceded that the guarantee clause of article IV, which
guarantees states a republican form of government and protection against invasion and domestic violence, may be read to exclude judicial enforcement.
Henkin, supra, at 609. Henkin would also recognize the courts' prerogative,
under general principles of equity, to refuse to remedy some constitutional violations. Id. at 617-22. Regardless of the courts' reason for refusing to overturn
unconstitutional federal statutes, Henkin's thesis does not refute the duty of
Congress itself to evaluate the constitutionality of legislation.
61. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
62. The requirement that a plaintiff bringing a constitutional challenge
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manageable standards for resolving" an issue or "the impossibility of deciding [an issue] without an initial policy determina63
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."
As with political questions, if the resolution of an equal
protection challenge would require unmanageable standard setting and policy making beyond judicial expertise, a court should
not address the merits but should allow the legislature to determine the statute's constitutionality. The court should indicate
that it has not determined the statute's constitutionality, but
rather has observed the limitation on its role in evaluating most
64
statutory classifications.
have standing to sue also limits court review of legislative acts. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a
United States taxpayer both challenged the Maternity Act of 1921 as exceeding the powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution and as violative of
states' rights protected by the tenth amendment. The Supreme Court held
that neither party had demonstrated sufficient injury to render the controversy justiciable. Justice Sutherland wrote:
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the
ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or
threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an
act. Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring
the law applicable to the controversy.
Id. at 488 (italics in original); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1974) (plaintiffs acting in capacity as citizens
lack standing to challenge service of members of Congress in armed forces reserve based on incompatibility clause of article I).
63. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
64. A number of commentators have noted the adverse effects of Supreme
Court decisions that appear to legitimize a statute without subjecting it to full
constitutional analysis. Professor Bickel argued that the Court should use
great political discretion in deciding which cases to hear and which not to hear.
A. BICKEL, supra note 59, at 131-33. Dean Choper suggested that Court decisions upholding federal statutes against states' rights claims may have encouraged Congress to exceed the bounds it would otherwise have thought
constitutionally proper. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCEss 231-33 (1980). Judge Mikva concluded from his previous
experience as a representative that Congress more willingly engages in constitutional debate when it acts in areas not subject to judicially imposed restraints. Mikva & Lundy, The 91st Congress and the Constitution, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 449, 484 (1971). Professor Sager used statutory restrictions on federally funded abortions to illustrate this point. When such proposals initially
arose in Congress, they triggered a great deal of legislative debate on their
constitutionality. The Supreme Court upheld the legislation in Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977). Despite the Court's admonition that legislatures are as
much the guardians of constitutional liberties as the courts, id. at 479-80, Congress engaged in little constitutional discussion during subsequent debates.
Sager, supra note 47, at 1227-28 n.48. When the Court and Congress each assumes that the other is ensuring adherence to the Constitution, legislation that
abridges constitutional rights goes unchecked.
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Unfortunately, the similarities between the political question doctrine and the Supreme Court's analysis of equal protection issues have been overlooked. The judiciary's refusal to
review the constitutionality of the Vietnam War 6 5 did not end
the legislative debate over the president's power to authorize
military operations without a congressional declaration of
war. 66 Likewise, the Court's decisions in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez67 and the many social
welfare cases 68 should not stifle debate over whether the classifications at issue satisfy the equal protection commands of the
69
fifth and fourteenth amendments.
65. See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (certiorari denied in
case in which lower court dismissed complaint challenging constitutionality of

Vietnam War).
66. Congress responded by enacting the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541-1548 (1982), which restricted the president's ability to "introduce
United States Armed Forces into hostilities" absent a declaration of war or
other specified situations. Id. § 1541(c).
67. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
68. See cases cited supra note 7.
69. Professor Cox has eloquently distinguished the roles of Congress and
the Court in constitutional decision making:
[Tihe question, is the statute constitutional, may deserve one answer
from the legislator and a different answer from the judge because
some of the [questions] on which the legislator is free, indeed, has a
duty, to make up his own mind may be foreclosed from judicial consideration by the judge's duty to defer to the legislative judgment. In
such cases, although the Supreme Court purports to say that the challenged measure is constitutional, in truth the decision is only that the
measure does not conflict with the Constitution given the finding or
judgment that Congress has expressed ....
Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations, 40 U. CIN. L.
REv. 199, 200 (1971) (emphasis in original).
Unfortunately, the Court has not responded clearly to this distinction.
Compare Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982) ("[t]he Equal Protection
Clause directs that 'all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike,'" although the legislature has "initial discretion" to decide who is alike
(quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920))) and
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) ("The Clause
announces a fundamental principle: the State must govern impartially.") with
Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 962-63 (1982) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) ("The Equal Protection Clause allows the States considerable leeway
to enact legislation that may appear to affect similarly situated people differently.") and Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("When the
basic classification is rationally based, uneven effects upon particular groups
within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional concern.").
Congress frequently abdicates constitutional decison making in part because of confusion about its proper role in such decision making. See Mikva,
How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L.
REV. 587, 587 (1983). The Supreme Court should distinguish substantive interpretations of constitutional norms from institutionally based decisions to defer
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II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
CONGRESSIONAL EXPANSION OF
EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES

The Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to participate in the constitutional debate concerning whether statutes
meet equal protection norms. Section five of the fourteenth
amendment gives Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 70 Congress may
enforce equal protection norms by prohibiting state acts that
the Court refuses, because of institutional concerns, to
71
condemn.
This power of Congress to limit state action with regard to
equal protection issues stems from the democratic process itself. Judges hesitate to invalidate legislation because they are
unelected. In contrast, legislation passed by Congress and
signed by the president 72 reflects the will of political branches
comprised of officials elected by and responsible to the people.
Judges uphold statutes to avoid weighing competing goals and
objectives. The legislative process, however, inherently involves such balancing, often producing compromise. Unlike
judges, legislators can simultaneously address a variety of issues, thus facilitating the development of public policy that reflects a fair balance of competing interests. Indeed, although
the judiciary may be ill-equipped to analyze the detailed and
complex problem of whether a given classification can be justified despite its overbreadth or underinclusiveness, the legislative process is designed to address such problems.
Despite the particular advantages of congressional enforcement, opponents have voiced objections to congressional expanto the legislature because of the delicate political relationship between the two
branches. When the Court upholds a statute without distinguishing between
these two rationales, it confuses the legislature and impedes legislative attempts to apply the Constitution in areas in which the Court declines an active
role.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
71. See Sager, supra note 47, at 1240 ("[W]here the Court has, on institutional grounds, stopped significantly short of full enforcement of a substantive
norm of the fourteenth amendment, Congress is empowered by section 5 to address conduct falling within the unenforced margin of the norm."). Compare
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding the congressional prohibition under the fourteenth amendment of literacy tests as a voting requirement) with Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (refusing
to find literacy tests a violation of the fourteenth amendment).
72. A supermajority in Congress also may pass legislation over a presidential veto. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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sion of equal protection guarantees. Objectors argue that the
Constitution does not authorize congressional enforcement. Indeed, they claim that the concept of federalism embodied in the
tenth amendment prohibits such a federal intrusion into state
legislating. Section five of the fourteenth amendment, coupled
with the concept of underenforcement, however, fully authorizes expansive congressional enforcement of equal protection,
and the tenth amendment poses no significant justiciable bar73
rier to congressional enforcement.
A.

SECTION FIVE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

74
The Supreme Court's decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan
confirmed that section five of the fourteenth amendment empowers Congress to mandate norms of equality in areas where
the Court has declined to act. 75 Appellees in that case challenged a federal statute that prohibited states from denying the
right to vote to literate Spanish-speaking citizens because of
their inability to read English. The Court previously had refused to find that literacy requirements violated the fourteenth
amendment. 76 The Court, however, sustained Congress's decision to extend equal protection to literate Hispanic voters. It
found the decision to be within Congress's greater competence
to determine whether the states' interests in encouraging fluency in English and ensuring intelligent use of the voting
77
franchise justified literacy requirements.
78
Oregon v. Mitchell is the only subsequent Supreme Court
decision to suggest any limitations on congressional authority to

73. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (principles
of federalism overriden by congressional power to enforce the Civil War
amendments). The tenth amendment's reservation of rights to the states does
raise a series of important nonjusticiable barriers to Congress's enforcement
power under § 5. See infra text accompanying notes 96-99.
74. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
75. Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In
a general discussion of equal protection principles, the Court wrote:
Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to enforce this mandate, but absent controlling congressional direction, the courts have
themselves devised standards for determining the validity of state legislation or other official action that is challenged as denying equal
protection. The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid
and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Id. at 439-40 (emphasis added).
76. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959).
77. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653-56.
78. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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enforce equality norms. In that case the Court held that a federal law extending voting rights to eighteen-year olds was unconstitutional as applied to state and local elections. 79 Oregon
v. Mitchell, however, cannot fairly be read as an obstacle to
congressional enforcement of equality norms under section five
of the fourteenth amendment.
As an initial matter, Oregon v. Mitchell represents the
opinion of a sharply divided Court. Five Justices wrote separately, and no one opinion commanded more than three votes.
Justice Black united with four of his colleagues to uphold the
eighteen-year-old voting rights provision as applied to federal
elections and united with the other four to invalidate it as applied to state and local contests.8 0 He believed that the Constitution expressly reserved to the states the power to determine
8
voting qualifications for nonfederal offices. '
More importantly, despite the particular outcome of the
case, the various opinions reveal a Court majority that strongly
79. Id. at 118 (Black, J., announcing the judgments of the Court). Subsequent to this decision, the minimum voting age was lowered to 18 for all elections. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
80. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall joined Justice Black
in concluding that the statutory reduction in the voting age for federal elections was constitutional. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart,
and Blackmun joined Justice Black in concluding that the statute could not be
applied to state elections. 400 U.S. at 118-19.
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall would have upheld the statute as
applied to both federal and state elections. They believed that even though
the 21-year-old voting age survived scrutiny under the rational basis test, the
Court's action did not prevent Congress from engaging in its own equal protection analysis of the issue. Id. at 247-49 (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.).
Justice Douglas similarly voted to uphold the statute in its entirety. Because the fourteenth amendment protects the right to vote, he concluded that
Congress could enforce the right under § 5 by lowering the voting age. Id. at
143-44 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
Justice Harlan believed that any congressional interference with the voting age was unconstitutional. He based his opinion on the strong belief, first
announced in his dissent in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330 (1962), that the
equal protection clause did not limit the states' power to establish voting qualifications. 400 U.S. at 154 (opinion of Harlan, J.).
Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
also opposed congressional regulation of any voting requirements, believing
that the Constitution specifically delegated such authority to the states. Id. at
287-91 (opinion of Stewart, J.). Justice Stewart thought that Congress did not
have the power under § 5 "to determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situations fall within the ambit of the [equal protection]
clause." Id. at 296 (restating his disagreement with the Court's opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan).
81. 400 U.S. at 124-25 (opinion of Black, J.).
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supported broad congressional enforcement of equality norms
in most areas in which states legislate. Justice Douglas wrote:
"Here we are dealing with the right of Congress to 'enforce' the
principles of equality enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment.
The right to 'enforce' granted by § 5 of that Amendment is, as
noted, parallel with the Necessary and Proper Clause ....",82
Likewise, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, noted that although the courts would normally uphold
classifications unless arbitrary or unreasonable, Congress could
itself determine whether justifications for statutory discrimination actually existed. 83 Finally, Justice Black, who cast the decisive vote against the statute on the grounds that the
Constitution gives states the power to determine voter qualifications absent a showing of racial discrimination, stated that in
areas not exclusively reserved to the states, Congress's enforcement power need not be so closely tied to the issue of racial
84
discrimination.
Many critics object to the Court's broad interpretation of
Congress's power to define constitutional norms because they
fear that Congress will dilute judicially established constitutional norms by creating new, conflicting rights.85 These critics
82. Id. at 142.
83. Id. at 248. Justice Brennan stated that, unlike courts, Congress "need
not stop once it determines that some reasonable men could believe the factual
basis exists. Section 5 empowers Congress to make its own determination on
the matter." Id.
84. Id. at 130.
85. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 667-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (majority holding allows Congress to qualify the Court's fourteenth
amendment decisions); Cohen, CongressionalPower to Interpret Due Process
and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 607-09, 612-13 (1975) (Congress
may be able "to dilute judicially declared protections"); Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed "Human
Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333, 427-28 (1982) (Congress by "adding protection for underenforced norms may dilute the protection already guaranteed
by the Court").
Professor Estreicher argued that § 5 does not grant Congress power to interpret the Constitution. Rather, § 5 empowers Congress to create "a system
of statutory rights" to further constitutional values identified by the Court. Id.
at 430-33. It is unclear, however, how Congress can enforce what Estreicher
calls "the ultimate constitutional objective of equality of opportunity," id. at
433, if Congress cannot define the content of that objective and if the Court is
unwilling to define it as broadly as Congress (or Estreicher) would like.
Professor Sager, anticipating Estreicher's argument, wrote that such an interpretation of § 5 removes virtually all limits on congressional power. Sager,
supra note 47, at 1237-38. In contrast, Sager's theory of underenforcement requires a nexus to the basic notion that statutes should treat equally those similarly situated. See id. at 1238 & n.88.
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fail to appreciate the Court's policy of underenforcement and
its premise that the Court's holdings do not necessarily reflect
the full scope of constitutional norms. The Supreme Court at
all times retains final power to determine what is and what is
not constitutional. If the Court declines to invalidate a statute
for institutional reasons, Congress may act; if a congressional
statute violates a norm that the Court is fully enforcing, that
86
statute must fall.

Critics also assert that Congress improperly substitutes its
judgment for that of the courts when it invalidates state statutes that have passed judicial scrutiny. These critics erroneously assume that the rational basis test and limited application
of heightened scrutiny constitute an equal protection norm, not
merely the judicial standard used to analyze the norm.8 7 The
use of these tests as part of an underenforcement technique
does not represent the courts' desire to formulate a complete
constitutional doctrine. Rather, it constitutes a minimum standard of analysis for equal protection issues. If the underlying
norm is that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike,"" Congress does not substitute its judgment for the
courts' when proscribing a state statute that was sustained
under the rational basis test but failed to satisfy this norm. In
fact, Congress may use institutional skills that the courts do not
86.

See id. at 1239-42. The Supreme Court has expressly so held. Missis-

sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982) (Congress cannot
validate a law that denies rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment).
87. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 214-15 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[I]t would be a topsy-turvy judicial system which
held that electoral changes which have been affirmatively proved to be permissible under the Constitution nonetheless [because of congressional action]
violate the Constitution."); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 667 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("The question here is ... whether there has in fact been an infringement of that constitutional command, that is, whether... a statute is so
arbitrary or irrational as to offend the command of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Choper, CongressionalPower to Expand JudicialDefinitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299, 320-21 (1982) (criticizing notion that Court should
"adopt the principle that it will defer to any 'reasonable' congressional determination that a state law is 'arbitrary,' 'irrational,' or 'unreasonable' ").
Chief Justice Rehnquist's disagreement with Katzenbach v. Morgan has
reappeared in subsequent opinions. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
262 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with proposition that Congress can define rights wholly independently of judicial precedent); Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1981) (Court would not
consider prospectively whether Congress could enforce § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment by creating a right to treatment in the absence of judicial recognition of such a right).
88. See cases cited supra note 52.
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possess to protect a judicially established norm.8 9
The underenforcement policy reveals that the rational basis test and limited application of heightened scrutiny do not
represent a constitutional norm, but a constitutional floor"simply a 'salutary principle of judicial decision.' "90 From this
perspective section five of the fourteenth amendment authorizes Congress to condemn statutes that the Court has not invalidated under the equal protection clause.

B.

THE TENTH AMENDMENT

Critics of congressional enforcement of the Constitution
could also object on the basis of tenth amendment principles of
states' rights. 91 The fourteenth amendment, however, by creating and authorizing Congress to enforce a constitutional right
of equal protection, shifted political power from the states to
Congress. 92 Moreover, in the latest decision in a series of cases
in which the Supreme Court discussed the power of Congress
to restrict state action, the Court indicated that most tenth
amendment challenges to actions by the federal government
are nonjusticiable. According to the Court, the structure of the
federal system adequately protects the states from undue congressional intrusion. 93 Even when the Court construed the
89. Justice Brennan explained this concept in a separate opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell:
The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum for
the determination of complex factual questions of the kind so often
involved in constitutional adjudication. Courts, therefore, will overturn a legislative determination of a factual question only if the legislature's finding is so clearly wrong that it may be characterized as
"arbitrary," "irrational," or "unreasonable."
Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process,
however, have no applicationto Congress.
400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 247 (quoting Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294
U.S. 580, 584 (1935)).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The amendment provides: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
92. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976). Any power which the
fourteenth amendment, as a subsequent amendment, conferred upon Congress
would supercede any conflicting rights extended to states by the earlier
amendment. Indeed, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments
adopted soon after the Civil War were expressly intended to constitute "limitations of the power of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress."
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
93. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985)
(5-4 decision) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
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tenth amendment as erecting a justiciable barrier to congressional action under the commerce clause, 94 it did not extend its
holding to exercises of congressional power under section five
95
of the fourteenth amendment.
The courts' refusal to treat tenth amendment claims as justiciable, however, does not mean that the amendment does not
contain constitutional norms limiting Congress's role in our
federal system. Both judicial and academic proponents of the
nonjusticiability approach recently adopted by the Supreme
Court have called for Congress to abide by these norms in its
decisions. 96 Recognizing that the nature and composition of
Congress safeguards federalism interests, the Court underenforces the tenth amendment and shifts the debate over congressional interference with state interests back into the halls
of Congress.
(1976) (5-4 decision) (overrulingMaryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968))). The
court in Garcia left open the possibility of judicially imposed limits on congressional power over the states if the internal safeguards of the national
political process did not function as intended. 469 U.S. at 556.
94. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) (congressional regulation of states as states prohibited under the tenth
amendment).
95. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (principles of
federalism overridden by power to enforce Civil War amendments).
My colleague Deborah Merritt has suggested that the guarantee clause of
article IV authorizes judicial invalidation of congressional statutes that unduly
intrude upon state sovereignty. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century,88 COLUM. L. REV. (1988) (forthcoming). If tenth amendment protections would not supersede § 5 congressional
enforcement, however, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would limit such
enforcement under the guarantee clause.
96. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556; National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
857 (Brennan, J., dissenting); J. CHOPER, supra note 64, at 175-76; Matsumoto,
National League of Cities-FromFootnote to Holding-StateImmunity from
Commerce ClauseRegulation, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 52 (1977) (cases affirming
congressional statutes "represent only a rejection of federalism as a judicially
applied limitation," which shifts to Congress the primary responsibility for applying the appropriate constitutional standard (emphasis in original));
Tushnet, Constitutionaland Statutory Analyses in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1301, 1343 (1978) (Court incorrectly assumed in NationalLeague of Cities "that constitutional limitations are meaningless unless
they are enforceable in the courts"). One observer noted that Congress gave
short shrift to tenth amendment concerns after the Court's decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding congressional acts that infringed
on state prerogatives without making clear that it was doing so for institutional reasons). See Mikva, supra note 69, at 593. Once the Court deflected the
issue back to Congress in Garcia,however, Congress quickly acted to accomodate local governments' concerns about application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to their employees. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787 (1985) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216 (1985)).
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In determining whether a piece of legislation violates tenth
amendment norms, Congress should consider several limitations on congressional power. The legislation should address
only problems calling for national solutions. If uniform state
application is not desired, Congress should adopt a consistent,
logical, and fair method of applying legislation to some states
but not others. 97 Congress should avoid adopting a national solution when state-by-state experimentation remains desirable.
Congress should also assure itself that the states are incapable
of dealing adequately with the problem. Through legislative
hearings and their own knowledge of state and local politics,
members of Congress should analyze whether political realities
prevent states from providing effective solutions. Finally, in
considering legislation affecting an area previously left to state
or local governments, Congress should weigh the seriousness of
the problem and the benefits of federal involvement against the
98
harm to the vitality of the other levels of government.
Although the Supreme Court has treated tenth amendment norms as nonjusticiable, Congress can conform to the constitutional limitations of the tenth amendment by following
these limitations. 99 These limitations reflect an appropriate
balance between the intended ordering of power in a federal
97. For example, § 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,
§ 4, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982)), imposed a host of remedies designed to assure greater participation in the electoral process only upon states or political subdivisions where literacy tests were
maintained prior to November 1, 1964, or where less than 50% of voting-age
residents were registered to vote on that date or voted in the 1964 presidential
election. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 317 (1966).
98. In reviewing the politics of the 1950s, a noted political scientist concluded that Supreme Court decisions upholding the New Deal legislation "in
effect, transferred to the care of Congress all questions of importance that
could have been handled by the states. The American states exist only as vestigial remnants .... " V.0. KEY, JR., AMERICAN STATE POLITICS 4 (1956). But
see Broder, Take it From the Governors,Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., Mar. 9,
1987, at 4 (contrasting "spirit, energy and willingness to step up to the challenges of change" by state government with "pervasive lethargy" in Washington).
A significant adverse impact on state government is an important factor to
be weighed in determining whether a federal statute, either alone or in combination with other statutes, effectively subverts the constitutional scheme of
federalism. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 775 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). When evaluating this impact on
states, particular concern should be taken to avoid undue interference with
the ability of citizens within a state to order the internal workings of state and
local government. See generally Merritt, supra note 95.
99. See J. CHOPER, supra note 64, at 184-90 (historical record demonstrates
congressional sensitivity to federalism concerns).
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system of government and the amended Constitution's concern
that all levels of government extend equal protection to all citizens. Assuming proposed congressional legislation overcomes
these federalism concerns, the following sections discuss how
Congress might more effectively guard against violations of the
equal protection guarantee by state legislatures.
III.

CONGRESSIONAL EXPANSION OF EQUAL
PROTECTION

Because section five of the fourteenth amendment empowers Congress to establish and protect equality rights, Congress
should direct other branches of government to increase protection under the equal protection clause and should establish a
system of constitutional analysis within the legislative process.
Congress may expand the judiciary's role by identifying additional suspect classes and fundamental rights and by increasing
the level of scrutiny in specified types of equal protection cases.
Furthermore, Congress may redirect governmental scrutiny in
cases involving discriminatory impact. Finally, Congress itself
may engage in constitutional analysis of questionable state
legislation.
A.
1.

INCREASING THE JUDIcIARY's

ROLE

Suspect Classes and Fundamental Rights

Unlike the Supreme Court, Congress is not constrained by
institutional concerns in determining when to carefully scrutinize state classifications. Congress should use a two-pronged
test to evaluate whether to declare a particular nonracial trait
suspect for purposes of invoking strict scrutiny and should authorize the courts to protect classes with such traits. Congress
should initially evaluate whether a distinction based on a particular trait is relevant in any conceivable context in which the
states might legislate, with such exemptions as Congress might
choose to establish. Congress should then consider whether
persons possessing the trait lack political power to defend
themselves against discriminatory treatment. 100
Congress is especially competent to determine whether certain traits are relevant to state classifications because of its factfinding and policy decision-making skills. Decisions such as
whether women should be treated the same as men in all cir100. Cf. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT 145-70 (1980) (reasons to apply
suspect class status to various minorities).
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cumstances or whether homosexuals might be singled out for
discriminatory treatment require a mix of fact finding and
value judgments suited to congressional consideration. 10 1
As to the second prong, the Supreme Court has specifically
adopted strict scrutiny to protect "discrete and insular minorities" 1 02 - those minority groups unable to protect themselves
through the political process. The Court's unwillingness to ex103
tend strict scrutiny to the poor, to women, and to aliens,
however, indicates that political discrimination is insufficient to
confer suspect status. Whatever the merits of this judicial approach, Congress itself may identify groups that are unable to
protect themselves through the state political process.
In some sense it is true that in this country we are all minorities. 10 4 Many minority groups have the economic or historical power to succeed in the political arena. Others can build
coalitions to achieve political clout. Some, however, due to size,
historic discrimination, or other factors, cannot protect themselves against the "tyranny of the majority" at the state
level.1 0 5 In many cases Congress may be no more solicitous
101. This is not to suggest that classifying such traits as suspect is necessarily beyond judicial competence. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973), four Justices (Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall) concluded that
gender is a suspect classification. Without refuting this finding, three Justices
(Powell, Burger, and Blackmun) refused to join the plurality because of the
contemporaneous national debate over the adoption of the Equal Rights
Amendment. Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). When not encumbered by
concerns about interfering with the amendment process, other courts have
characterized gender as a suspect class. See, e.g., Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5
Cal. 3d 1, 17, 485 P.2d 529, 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339 (1971); Hewitt v. State
Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 294 Or. 33, 46, 653 P.2d 970, 977-78 (1982); Hanson v.
Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 199, 517 P.2d 599, 602 (1973); Peters v. Narick, 270
S.E.2d 760, 765-66 (W. Va. 1980); see also Comment, Equal Rights Provisions:
The Experience Under State Constitutions, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1086 (1977)
(levels of scrutiny used for gender in 16 state courts).
The decision whether to extend the protection of heightened judicial scrutiny to homosexuals has been discussed in terms of fundamental rights analysis. In People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980),
the court did not consider whether homosexuals were a suspect class, having
held that the fundamental right of privacy protected the noncommercial, cloistered sexual conduct of homosexuals. But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct.
2841, 2844 (1986) (right of privacy does not extend to sexual conduct of
homosexuals).
102. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
103. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
104. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292-93 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) (discussing the "racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity of
the Nation").
105. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 720
(1985). Ackerman makes the intriguing point that, contrary to the assumption
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than state legislatures of protecting victimized groups. Congress's power can be exercised, however, to address discriminatory animus centered in particular regions or in a minority of
states. 10 6 For example, an overwhelming majority in Congress
proposed the Equal Rights Amendment but a minority of primarily southern and rural states rejected it. 10 7 In such a situation, Congress could extend strict scrutiny to discrimination
against women, superceding the actions of those states. Similarly, protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation could be forthcoming despite strong resistance from
portions of the country.
2.

Increased Judicial Balancing

Congressional authority to expand judicial scrutiny in
equal protection litigation affords greater doctrinal flexibility
than exists under current decisions. As noted above, Congress
could authorize an expansion of strict scrutiny to include legislation that is discriminatory in all cases without sharply delineated exceptions. 0 8 Conversely, Congress may find situations
when the hands-off attitude of the rational basis test is
appropriate.
Between these two standards is a spectrum of approaches
of the famous CaroleneProducts footnote, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4, minority groups
that are anonymous and dispersed have greater difficulty in the political arena
than discrete and insular racial or religious minorities. Ackerman, supra, at
723-24. Under Ackerman's view homosexuals and the poor would have more
difficulty politically than would racial or religious minorities.
Women, who comprise a numerical majority of the population, historically
have been silenced in the political arena. As late as 1972, for example, there
were no women in the United States Senate and only 14 in the House of Representatives. Only one woman in the previous 20 years had chaired a congressional committee. Less than three percent of top federal bureaucrats (holding
ranks at GS-16 or above) were women, there were no women governors, and
less than six percent of state legislators were women. Joint Reply Brief of Appellants and American Civil Liberties Union Amicus Curiaeat 8-9, Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (No. 71-1694).
106. Congress's enactment of civil rights, voting rights, and employment
discrimination legislation demonstrates its ability and willingness to enact statutes that benefit minority interests. Hatch, Book Review, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1347, 1360-61 (1986) (reviewing L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIs HONORABLE COURT
(1978)).
107. Congress passed the resolution proposing the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in 1972 by a House vote of 354-24 and a Senate vote of 84-8. 117
CONG. REC. 35815 (1971) (House); 118 CONG. REC. 9598 (1972) (Senate). For the
geographic distribution of states opposing the ERA, see Burris, Who Opposed
the ERA? An Analysis of the Social Bases of Antifeminism, 64 Soc. Sci. Q.
305, 315-16 (1983).
108. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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that enhances the courts' ability to determine whether a state
legislative classification meets equality norms. 10 9 For example,
although courts currently uphold statutes under the rational
basis test if they can find any real or hypothetical legitimate
purpose, Congress could authorize courts to examine only those
goals" ° the legislature actually considered."' This authorization would thereby mandate the rejection of purposes hypothe12
sized by the state's attorneys in the context of litigation."
Similarly, in evaluating whether the challenged classification is
sufficiently related to the purpose of the legislation, Congress
could authorize courts to review the underlying legislative facts
and strike down statutes if the factual assumptions are proven
false. In such situations Congress should explicitly identify factors to be considered in evaluating a particular classification
and direct courts to make determinations on a case-by-case
3
basis."
109. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 16-30, at 1082-89 (discussing variety
of possible tests).
110. Unless, of course, the goal is itself constitutionally prohibited. See,
e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 878 (1985) (purpose to aid
domestic industry by discriminating against foreign companies "constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent"); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973) ("[A] desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest.") (emphasis in original); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (purpose of inhibiting migration from another
state is "constitutionally impermissible"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 n.11
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (interest in preventing interracial marriages is
"repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment").
111. Determining what the legislature actually considered requires legislative history. States which currently do not preserve legislative history would
need to develop procedures to do so. Such a requirement might result in the
incidental benefit of increased public understanding of the legislative process.
112. This aspect of the rational basis test has been criticized as giving the
state's attorney inordinate power to make or break a constitutional challenge
depending on which purposes the attorney chooses to ascribe to the challenged
statute. Linde, supra note 46, at 213.
113. For example, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S 55 (1980), the
Supreme Court held that state or local statutes governing elections or reapportionment would be sustained against racial discrimination challenges unless
the plaintiffs proved that the electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted
or maintained for a discriminatory purpose. Congress responded by amending
the Voting Rights Act to require a reviewing court to determine whether,
"based on the totality of circumstances," racial minorities are denied equal
political participation. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97205, § 3(b), 96 Stat. 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982)).
The legislative history listed numerous factors for the courts to apply. S. REP.
No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982); see Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct.
2752, 2759-60 (1986) (listing the relevant factors as stated by the Senate Judiciary Committee).
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Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to explicitly engage in case-by-case balancing of interests under the
equal protection clause, 114 the judiciary frequently balances interests in other contexts. For instance, courts exclude evidence
from trials when its prejudicial effect outweighs its probity. 115
In antitrust litigation, courts analyze challenged restrictive
trade practices under a "rule of reason" to determine if the
11 6
practice's competitive benefits outweigh the resulting harms.
a state regulaFederal courts explicitly balance interests when
117
tion allegedly violates the commerce clause.
Arguably, these types of judicial balancing are distinguishable because, unlike equal protection cases, they can be reversed by statute.11 8 This distinction is illusory, however,
114. Despite Justice Marshall's advocacy of such an approach, see, e.g., San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting), the Court has, albeit with some significant deviations, see supra text
accompanying notes 20-21, preserved the two-tier dichotomy in equal protection analysis. For most statutes the judicial refusal to balance competing interests results in a rejection of the equal protection challenge. See supra text
accompanying notes 44-46.
115. See, e.g., State v. Flett, 234 Or. 124, 127-29, 380 P.2d 634, 636-37 (1963)
(prejudicial effect of evidence of marital infidelity outweighed probative value
in manslaughter case). This common-law doctrine has been incorporated into
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 185, at 545 n.27 (3d ed. 1984).
116. See, e.g., Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)
("Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case
117. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex -el. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761,
783-84 (1945) ("[Eixamination of all the relevant factors makes it plain that
the state interest is outweighed by the interest of the nation .... ).
118. In Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court
held that the trial judge may balance possible prejudice against the probative
value of a criminal defendant's prior convictions. After extensive legislative
review, Congress changed this rule to require the trial judge to admit evidence, on cross-examination, of certain prior crimes. FED. R. EVID. 609(a); see
H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 9 (1974) (conference report). Other
examples of statutory modifications of judicial balancing include the National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1816 (1984)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4302 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) and its accompanying conference report, H.R. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1984) (specifying rule of reason approach to be used by courts in evaluating
antitrust liability of research joint ventures), and 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982)
(authorizing states to prohibit chartering of out-of-state banks). But see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (balancing the interest of the
plaintiff, the risk of error, and the governmental interest in minimizing burdens in deciding, as a matter of constitutional law, whether challenged procedures comport with due process clause).
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because Congress could also revise any court decision applying
a congressionally authorized balancing test. Institutional considerations that may have led the Court to reject case-by-case
119
balancing of equal protection thus fade away.
While a state legislature may be more qualified than the
judiciary to weigh competing interests in social legislation, this
is not always the case, particularly when regional biases come
into play. For example, states may unduly favor their own parochial interests when dealing with interstate commerce. In
such situations judges properly weigh the various competing
concerns, not because they have some peculiar competence in
matters of interstate trade, but because fear of bias places the
state's competence in question. 1 20 Similarly, if Congress perceives that a state legislature has discriminated against a class
of people possessing an unpopular trait or exercising an unpopular right, Congress is justified in preferring that judges, insulated from the pressures and biases of the contemporary
majority, weigh the competing interests.
B.

AGENCY REVIEW OF DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT

In addition to expanding suspect classifications and increasing the levels of scrutiny, Congress should also evaluate
whether a facially neutral statute violates equal protection if
passed without a discriminatory purpose. Proving that a state
adopted a particular classification to harm racial minorities is
difficult indeed. Under current doctrine, no matter how harsh
the impact on racial minorities, a state that was indifferent to a
statute's discriminatory consequences will face only minimal judicial scrutiny. 12 ' Because the Court's position reflects institutional limitations, not a constitutional mandate, Congress could
legislatively require more extensive federal intervention on behalf of racial minorities under the fourteenth amendment.
Undoubtedly, a blanket prohibition against acts that dispro119. Congressional authorization of judicial balancing also eliminates concern that a judicially imposed balancing test would inevitably lead to less stringent judicial review of those classifications now strictly scrutinized by the
courts. Cf. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 608-09, 586 P.2d 916, 932,
150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 450 (1978) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (fearing that an intermediate level equal protection test would eventually weaken the strict scrutiny
test).
120. Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767 n.2 ("[T]o the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be
alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when
interests within the state are affected.").
121. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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portionately affect racial minorities would endanger a host of
tax,122 welfare, 123 licensing, 124 and regulatory 25 statutes that
are more burdensome to the poor, who are disproportionately
black, than to the affluent. 126 A more sensible approach to enforcing equal protection norms lies in balancing competing
interests.
Sometimes racially discriminatory impact can be offset by
mitigating measures. For example, colleges and universities
that process a large number of applications for admission may
legitimately need to use objective criteria such as grades and
test scores. Schools could offset any resulting disproportionate
impact by adopting an affirmative action program that allows
127
deviation from objective measurements.
122. The sales tax disproportionately affects the poor because they spend a
larger percentage of their income on taxable items than do wealthier persons.
M. GRAETz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 19 (1985).
123. In Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), the Texas legislature imposed more stringent budget cuts on aid to families with dependent children,
of which racial minorities represented 87% of the recipients, than on aid to the
elderly, of which racial minorities represented less than 40% of the recipients.
Id. at 548 n.17.
124. Statutes or regulations that limit entry into a field but allow incumbents to transfer their operating rights to others (for example, taxicab medallions) significantly raise the cost of entering the business. This, of course,
hurts the poor more than the wealthy. When entry-limiting statutes are not
coupled with effective rate regulation, the resulting insulation from open competition allows incumbents to raise rates above a competitive level. With more
limited income at their disposal, the poor suffer from monopoly exploitation
more than the rich. See FTC Staff Urges Chicago to Dump Entry Barriers in
Taxicab Market, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1298, at 90 (Jan.
15, 1987) (FTC advised that taxicab market monopolization adversely affected
service to low-income neighborhoods).
125. Zoning and land use restrictions promote environmental goals but also
deny housing opportunities to the poor and perpetuate socioeconomic segregation. Comment, Exclusionary Zoning in California: A Statutory llechanism
for JudicialNondeference, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1154, 1154 (1979).
126. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
127. Using this analysis, the defendants in Washington v. Davis may have
prevailed even under heightened judicial scrutiny. Although the Washington,
D.C., police department's standardized test had a disproportionate racial impact, a heavy, minority recruiting drive resulted in blacks comprising 44% of
recent recruits, a figure that corresponded to the percentage of 20- to 29-yearold blacks in the recruiting area. 426 U.S. at 235; cf. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 n.43 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) ("To the extent that race and ethnic background were considered only to the extent of
curing established inaccuracies in predicting academic performance, it might
be argued that there is no 'preference' at all."). But see Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982) (rejecting under title VII such a "bottom line" justification as a defense to a non-job-related test with disproportionate racial
effects).
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When the discriminatory impact cannot easily be mitigated,
however, a decision maker must choose between competing interests. For instance, many law school faculties believe that to
maintain a school's academic standing and reputation, academic
appointments should be based on law school grades, clerkships,
publications, and recommendations from fellow academics. An
equal protection challenge to a public school's decision to use
such criteria will not be sustained under Washington v. Davis
even if it results in an all-white faculty.128 Although faculties
may be best able to decide whether these hiring criteria will
provide a prestigious faculty, they are not well suited to balance
this legitimate interest against constitutional norms of equality.
Congress could determine that faculties overemphasize academic ranking and that the need to correct historic patterns of
racial discrimination requires that hiring decisions be subject to
challenge and review by another decision maker.
Although Congress could assign this balancing task to the
federal judiciary, it might share the courts' concern about the
limits of judicial competence and therefore assign the task to a
specialized agency. For instance, the reasonableness of tests in
an employment or educational context might depend on the
nexus between the test requirements and the employer's or
faculty's real objectives. Determining that relationship, evaluating mitigating factors, and shaping appropriate remedies
often requires specialized knowledge and extensive investigation. Thus, an expert nonjudicial decision maker could better
ensure the adequate review of statutes that disproportionately
affect minorities.
C.

SPECIFIC CONGRESSIONAL PROHIBITIONS

What Congress may authorize courts or agencies to do in
striking down discriminatory state statutes, it may do itself.
Congress can conduct hearings and develop factual records to
determine whether state actions violate judicially underenforced constitutional norms of equality.129 The Supreme
128. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
129. An important corollary of the underenforcement thesis is that Congress cannot exercise its § 5 powers to expand equal protection guarantees in
areas in which the Court is not underenforcing the fourteenth amendment.
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. The state action requirement is
one area of equal protection doctrine in which the Court has been unclear as
to whether its opinions constitute underenforcement. The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 9-11 (1883), held that Congress could not use § 5 to prohibit racial
discrimination by private persons. The language of that opinion did not sug-
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Court confirmed this authority in Katzenbach v. Morgan,1 30 upholding Congress's statutory prohibition of state-imposed literof their discriminatory effect upon literate
acy tests because
131
minorities.
In addition to broad review of potential areas of discrimination, Congress can review specific state statutes and determine
whether they violate norms of equal protection not fully enforced by the judiciary. For example, in Williamson v. Lee Optical132 the challenged Oklahoma statute prohibited opticians
from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from
an ophthalmologist or optometrist but allowed retail stores to
sell ready-to-wear glasses without any prior optometric consultation.1 33 The Court upheld the statute, declaring that it was
for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages
34
and disadvantages of the new requirement.
If faced with a state statute similar to that in Lee Optical,
Congress could evaluate the statute in the same manner as the
Oklahoma legislature. 135 A congressional inquiry might detergest underenforcement. See id. at 10 (noting responsibility of Court to make
independent judgment); id. at 11 ("Individual invasion of individual rights is
not the subject-matter of the amendment."). To the extent that the state action requirement is not underenforcement, Congress lacks authority to proscribe private conduct pursuant to § 5.
A complex body of law has developed construing the state action requirement. See generally 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 52, § 16;
L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 18. In some cases the Court has permitted challenges to private party actions. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
(company town). In other cases Congress has achieved similar results using
other constitutional grants of power, such as the thirteenth amendment, which
contain no state action requirement. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968) (thirteenth amendment used to require sale of private
home to black individual). In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), six
Justices in two separate opinions expressed the view that Congress could prohibit private conspiracies to violate fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 762
(Clark, J., concurring); id. at 777 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Justice Brennan,
writing for a unanimous Court in District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418,
424 n.8 (1973), cited the Guest opinions with approval in dicta. See also L.
TRIBE, supra note 46, § 15-15, at 274 (Congress could find that a state's failure
to punish private discrimination constitutes state action and thus could prohibit private discrimination under § 5).
130. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
131. Id. at 643 n.1.
132. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
133. Id. at 485 n.1, 488 n.2. The Oklahoma Attorney General argued that
the prescription requirement ensured that Oklahomans received "the best possible visual care." Lee Optical v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 133 (W.D. Okla.
1954), affd, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
134. 348 U.S. at 487-88.
135. Any disagreement between the state legislature and Congress would
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mine that the purported state goal of promoting eye care was
not legitimate because, as a factual matter, such visits were unnecessary and inflated the cost of eyeglasses, resulting in undue
profits for opthalmologists and optometrists and undue losses
for opticians. If so, opticians could obtain congressional relief
from the state's denial of equal protection.
As a limitation on such congressional action, Congress
should resist prohibiting those state statutes unless it would
support a nationwide ban and the states themselves were politically unlikely to remedy the discrimination. If this limitation is
followed, Congress will promote equal protection by permitting
national consensus in favor of equal treatment to overcome
136
breakdowns in state political processes.
Although Congress could abuse this power, the consequences do not significantly threaten the status quo. Congress
clearly has the power to preempt state regulation of optical
sales under the commerce clause. 137 Thus, Congress's active
promotion of equal protection under section five of the fourbe judicially resolved in favor of Congress under the supremacy clause. See
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 240, 248-49 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White,
and Marshall, JJ.). The mere fact that Congress disagreed with the state legislature's factual determinations should not be determinative for Congress, however. To justify use of congressional authority under § 5, the opticians and
their allies must overcome the obstacles concerning states' rights set forth
above. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
136. A full discussion on the uses of the concept of underenforcement concerning other constitutional provisions is beyond the scope of this Article. One
other noteworthy area is the fifth amendment's protection against the taking
of property without compensation. See Sager, supra note 47, at 1219 & n.22.
Courts often permit the government to use its regulatory power in ways which
reduce property values without providing compensation. This permissiveness
may be because courts are institutionally incapable of making the complex
"fairness" determinations necessary to decide when compensation should be
awarded, except in the most egregious cases. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1246-51 (1967).
137. Although the concerns underlying the commerce clause overlap with
those underlying the equal protection clause, they have a different focus.
Under the commerce clause, Congress should focus on the effect state statutes
may have on consumers and interstate trade. Under the equal protection
clause, the emphasis should be on fairness and equitable treatment of those affected by the classification. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S.
869, 876 n.6 (1985) (clause concerned with discrimination, not implications for
state and local interests). A classification might be grossly unfair to a politically powerless minority group, yet have no discernable effect on interstate
commerce. For a general criticism of the use of the commerce clause to prohibit discrimination, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 163 (11th ed.
1985) ("The aim of the proposed anti-discrimination legislation, I take it, is
quite unrelated to any concern with national commerce in any substantive
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teenth amendment would not increase the power of special interest groups to pressure Congress into invalidating state laws
without good cause.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE APPLICATION OF EQUAL
PROTECTION PRINCIPLES

The preceding discussion addressed the roles of Congress
and the judiciary in restraining state legislative acts that violate
equal protection norms. At the heart of American constitutional theory is the belief that such external restraints are essential. Indeed, a principal purpose for adopting a written
constitution as the supreme law of the land is to provide a
mechanism for outside forces, most often the judiciary, to check
legislative acts that stray from the principles that bind the
138
nation.
External restraints, however, do not release a legislature
from the duty of ensuring that its own actions conform to constitutional mandates. 13 9 Because state and federal legislators
are sworn to uphold the Constitution1 40 and courts often underenforce constitutional protections, legislators must not leave
constitutional questions solely to the courts. Thus, legislators
confronted with legislation that possibly runs afoul of constitutional norms have a responsibility to assure themselves that the
14
legislation is constitutional. '
sense." (quoting a letter from Gerald Gunther to the Department of Justice
(June 5, 1963))).
138. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
139. For a discussion of that duty, see supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
140. See supra text accompanying note 11.
141. A legislator who abdicates to the courts the responsibility for constitutional decision making significantly weakens the guarantees of the equal protection clause in areas in which courts underenforce the clause. Although
troublesome in theory, the practical effect is much less serious when a legislator, to achieve an otherwise legitimate legislative goal, votes in favor of a bill
that courts clearly will strike down. For instance, in 1971 liberal California
State Senator Anthony Beilenson reached agreement with conservative Governor Ronald Reagan on a welfare reform package that increased benefits to the
poor but imposed a residency requirement similar to one the Court invalidated
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (certain public benefits denied to residents of under one year). See Pearlman, Welfare Administration
and the Rights of Welfare Recipients, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 19, 47 n.174 (1977).
The California residency requirement was quickly struck down by the courts.
See id. at 46-47 & n.172 (citing Brown v. Carleson, No. 217636 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Feb. 15, 1972) (no appeal taken)).
This situation should occur infrequently. In essence, Beilenson received
something for nothing. Reagan's agreement can be explained only as the re-
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In the area of equal protection, federal representatives and
senators are as obligated as state legislators to examine the constitutionality of their actions. The Supreme Court has held
that equal protection analysis under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment parallels analysis under the fourteenth
amendment. 142 The congressional burden arguably exceeds
that of state legislators because, as demonstrated in Part II,
Congress may override state legislation when the judiciary
chooses to underenforce the equal protection clause. 143 Excluding federal court oversight, however, Congress is free of any restraint unless it acknowledges the responsibility itself.
This Article does not attempt to identify the exact contours
of the equality norm expressed in the fourteenth amendment,
once the norm is stripped of institutional limitations relevant to
judicial review. As demonstrated in Part II, this norm extends
far beyond the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test.
There also appears to be widespread agreement that the goal of
44
equality is equal treatment for all those similarly situated.
The legislatures and courts, however, can never achieve a perfect correlation between this goal and legislative classifications.
Because of this imperfect correlation, Professors Tussman and
tenBroek suggest that gaps due to overbroad or underinclusive
statutes must be "reasonable,"'1 45 while Professor Sager argues
that the equal protection guarantee mandates that "a state may
treat persons differently only when it is fair to do so.' 1 4 6 Regardless of the precise contours of the equality norm or the difficulty of relating if to legislation, constitutional adherence to
the norm requires at least a careful legislative examination of
the ends and means used in a statutory scheme. The examination may be divided into three areas of inquiry: the legitimacy
sult of poor legal advice or a desire to dupe the uninformed public into believing he was reducing welfare benefits, when in fact he was acquiescing to
demands of liberal legislators.
142. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) ("This Court's
approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
143. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976) (Congress's
authority to enforce equal protection norms under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment is "carved out of [state power]," and thus limits states' sovereign
immunity (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880))).
144. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
145. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 52, at 344, 346.
146. Sager, supra note 47, at 1215.
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of the purpose, the costs and benefits of proposed legislation in
terms of equality, and the fit between ends and means.

A. THE FIRST INQUIRY: A LEGITIMATE PURPOSE
The courts, as earlier described, accept any conceivable, legitimate purpose to justify a statutory classification that does
not invoke heightened scrutiny. 47 Furthermore, under a rational basis test, the legislature's actual reasons for enacting the
statute are treated as irrelevant. 148 This treatment does not
represent a judicial evaluation of equality norms; rather, it reflects the longstanding institutional reluctance to probe the legislature's motivation. 149
Legislators, however, can investigate a bill's purpose unconstrained by a need to defer to another branch of government. 50 A legislator should identify the reasons why the bill is
being sponsored, either directly from the bill's author, from
those close to the author, or from outside groups on whose behalf the bill was introduced. The bill's purposes or ends to
which it is directed should be clear to the legislator.
If a statute has two plausible purposes, only one of which is
legitimate, courts will accept that purpose unless presented
with clear evidence of contrary legislative intent, but a legislator need not rely on such a presumption. If a statutory classification was motivated by an impermissible purpose, legislators
15
must oppose the legislation. '
147. See supra text accompanying note 45.
148. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1981) ("ITIhe
purposes of the [statute are] not open to impeachment by evidence that the
legislature was actually motivated by an impermissible purpose.").
149. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) ("Inquiries
into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter."); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 131 (1810) (Court "cannot sustain a suit" attacking
a statute "in consequence of the impure motives which influenced certain
members of the legislature which passed the law").
The difficulties courts face are compounded by the hypothetical raised by
Justice Rehnquist in his dissent to Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,
450 U.S. 662, 703 (1980): How would a court divine the actual legislative purpose if the legislative history indicated that the statute passed by a vote of 4020, and that, of the 40 votes favoring the legislation, 10 were based on legitimate considerations, 10 were based on impermissible factors, and 20 were not
explained?
150. "While congressmen are quite ordinary in general outline, their practice of the political art has made them knowledgeable in assessing one another. Their instincts, sharpened by the conflict of the personal and the
impersonal, enable them to characterize each other to the finest hair." C.
MILLER, MEMBER OF THE HOUSE 106 (1962).
151. Legislators must follow judicial decisions declaring specified purposes
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Dean Brest made a similar point regarding the first amendment protection for free speech. Brest used the example of the
federal statute criminalizing the burning of draft cards to argue
that legislators should consider the constitutionality of their
purposes for drafting legislation. 152 The Supreme Court upheld
the statute in United States v. O'Brien 53 based on the asserted
purpose of ensuring the smooth functioning of the selective service system.15 4 The legislature, however, had an equally plausible, illegitimate intent to hinder an effective constitutional
protest against the draft and the Vietnam War. Brest argued
that legislators should have opposed the bill if their only reason
for supporting it was the latter, constitutionally impermissible
purpose. 155 As Brest argued, legislators should not hide behind
the sophistry of clever attorneys who concoct fictional, but legitimate, purposes for otherwise illegitimate statutes or play
upon the courts' anxieties over examining legislative motives.
A more difficult problem arises when a proposal, which is
either unconstitutional itself or creates inequitable exceptions
for certain classes of individuals, is offered as an amendment to
otherwise desirable and constitutional legislation. For instance,
assume that a state senate is considering workers' compensation legislation and that no principled reason exists to exclude
agricultural workers from the compensation plan. Assume further that a coalition of those who oppose all workers' compensation legislation and those who unconstitutionally seek to
exempt agricultural workers have a sufficient number of votes
to defeat the legislation unless the senate amends it. The hypoto be impermissible. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
732-33 (1982) (Congress has no power to dilute judicially established equal protection rights); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (same).
For example, a state may not justify a statutory classification based on an illegitimate purpose, such as discrimination on the basis of race, national origin,
gender, religion, or the exercise of constitutional rights. See supra note 110.
In addition, certain methods of achieving otherwise legitimate state objectives
have been held to be impermissible. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 694-95 (1977) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (state cannot discourage premarital teenage sex by limiting access to contraceptives); id. at 71516 (Stevens, J., concurring) (state may not deter sexual activity by minors
through sanction of pregnancy or venereal disease); Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 769 (1977) (state cannot punish illegitimate children to discourage
their parents from extramarital sexual contact or conception).
152. Brest, The ConscientiousLegislator's Guide to ConstitutionalInterpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 590 (1975). The analysis does not differ depending upon whether free speech or equal protection values are involved.
153. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
154. Id. at 377-81.
155. Brest, supra note 152, at 586.
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thetical Senator A, who wishes to remain faithful to the constitutional oath but favors workers' compensation, faces the
dilemma of whether or not to support the amendment.
This hypothetical emphasizes the difficulty of enacting
sound public policies fully consistent with equality norms. Of
course, Senator A should use all of her political skills to excise
the offending exemption. If these efforts prove unsuccessful,
Senator A must weigh the legislation's overall benefits and the
need for its immediate passage against the harm to the victimized group. If by adamantly insisting that the legislation include all workers, Senator A will obtain passage of the bill
within an appropriate time frame, she should continue to oppose amendment. On the other hand, if the need for the legislation is immediate and the bill as amended would be a genuine
first step toward equal treatment within a reasonable period of
56
time, Senator A need not advocate the amendment's defeat.,
In the most troublesome scenario, Senator A realizes that the
political situation is not likely to change and the legislation is
critical, and therefore political realities dictate acceptance of a
compromise containing an improper exemption. 157 Despite the
potentially different outcomes depending on the political realities, Senator A has at least deliberated with the purposes of the
statute in mind.
156. It is legitimate and often necessary to implement reforms experimentally or in piecemeal fashion to successfully accomplish a policy objective. See
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("[R]eform may take place
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind."); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 52, at
349; cf. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 969-70 (1982) (upholding statute
under rational basis test because reform taken 150 years ago was a "first
step").
Similarly, short-term differential treatment of similarly situated persons
may be justified as part of a legitimate experimental program. See, e.g.,
Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1109-10 (2d Cir. 1973) (random selection
of welfare recipients for work assignments), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
157. This is particularly true when comprehensive legislation contains provisions important to the legislator, but also includes unconstitutional provisions that cannot be struck by amendment. Cf. 100 CONG. REc. 14,209 (1954)
(remarks of Rep. Celler) (despite concern that one section of Communist Control Act of 1954 would be unconstitutional, support for the bill was justified
because, on balance, the good outweighed the evil).
The fact that the current equal protection jurisprudence does not adequately deal with the situation discussed in the text has led many to call for
more meaningful judicial review than that provided by the rational basis test.
See 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 52, at 329-30 (citing various authorities); Gunther, supra note 16, at 18-19.
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WEIGHING BENEFITS AND COSTS

To say that a purpose is legitimate does not mean that all
discrimination intended to further it is consistent with norms of
equality. Legislators must determine whether attainment of
the goal is worth the harm to the misclassified. Although a test
that balances costs and benefits of legislation will necessarily
lead to something of a gestalt judgment by each legislator, a
judgment that considers the equities dictated by equality norms
should be rigorous and analytical.
The Kansas debt-adjusting statute, which the Supreme
Court upheld in Ferguson v. Skrupa,'158 provides a useful example of the equities that legislators must consider. The statute
prohibited debt adjusting, a practice in which a debtor pays a
lump sum to an adjuster who then, for a fee, distributes it
among specified creditors according to an agreed plan. The
statutory ban, however, exempted acts by attorneys in the normal course of legal representation. 159 The legislature's purpose
in enacting the statute, according to the Kansas Attorney General, was to end grave abuses of the practice, especially against
low-income debtors.1 60 By limiting debt adjusting to attorneys,
the Kansas legislature presumably sought to ensure that debt
adjusting would be offered to clients as one of several options,
including bankruptcy.161 The legislature may have also concluded that attorneys, who are subject to high ethical standards,
would not engage in abusive practices. 162 Despite its concerns,
the Kansas legislature did not perfectly tailor the statute to end
all abuses in debt adjusting: lawyers who were not knowledgeable or ethical could continue to adjust debts while adjusters
who were not lawyers but possessed the requisite skills and integrity would be put out of business. 163 A legislator, faced with
158. 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963).
159. See Skrupa v. Sanborn, 210 F. Supp. 200, 201 (D. Kan. 1961) (threejudge court), rev'd sub nom. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
160. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 727.
161. Skrupa v. Sanborn, 210 F. Supp. at 203 (Stanley, J., dissenting).
162. See, e.g., American Budget Corp. v. Furman, 67 N.J. Super. 134, 143,
170 A.2d 63, 68 (1961) ("Attorneys do not advertise and are subject to a high
ethical standard."), affd, 36 N.J. 129, 175 A.2d 622 (1961).
163. As noted in the dissenting opinion in Skrupa v. Sanborn, 210 F. Supp.
at 203, another possible explanation for the statute was the legislature's desire
to protect debtors from adjuster conflicts of interest. Debt adjusters collect
their fees only if their clients agree to adjustment as a means of resolving
their financial difficulties. Attorneys, on the other hand, have no personal interest in advising clients either to pursue debt adjustment or to file for bankruptcy because they collect their fees in either case. If this was the real
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such a statute, should satisfy himself that the benefits of obtaining knowledgeable and honest debt service-discounted by
the gap between this goal and the statutory classification
designed to achieve it-outweigh the costs to skilled, honest,
nonlawyer debt adjusters against whom the statute
64
discriminates.
C. THE THIRD INQUIRY: A SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE FIT BETWEEN
ENDS AND MEANS

Defenders of a statute attacked on equal protection
grounds must show, under the strict scrutiny test, the absence
of less restrictive alternatives to accomplish the legislature's
purpose. Under the rational basis test, in contrast, courts do
not seriously examine alternative ways of achieving the state's
purpose1 65 because they are not equipped to balance the costs
1 66
and benefits of possible alternatives.
Unlike courts, however, legislators engage in such balancing every day and can evaluate alternatives as part of the legislative process. 167 Examining a variety of alternatives enables
legislators to reduce a bill's overbreadth or underinclusiveness.
To achieve this goal, legislators should support any alternative
that minimizes misclassification, unless its additional costs outweigh the benefits of more accurate classification. In assessing
alternatives legislators should consider the following factors:
the number of people misclassified and the importance of their
interests, the extent to which the classification interferes with
those interests, the financial and other costs of each alternative,
the degree to which each achieves the legislative purpose, and
the harm of any new misclassifications that each might
explanation for the statute, then there was a direct fit between the legislature's end-ensuring that only persons who could also aid in bankruptcy proceedings would give advice on debt adjustment-and its means-permitting
only lawyers to perform debt adjustment services.
164. Thus, although under the rational basis test a judge asks whether the
classification could conceivably further a legitimate public purpose, a legislator
must ask whether the classification actually advances public purposes and in
such a way that there is a net improvement in the public welfare. See Brest,
supra note 152, at 595.
165. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981);
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
166. See supra text accompanying note 59.
167. For a discussion of the means by which legislators may initiate analysis of constitutionality, see infra text accompanying notes 187-90.
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create. 168
Returning to the Kansas ban on nonattorney debt adjusting
as an example, the legislature's real concern may have been
that debt adjusters, unlike attorneys, were not highly regulated
by the state.169 An alternative to prohibiting nonattorney adjusters would have been to license them. The legislature would
have to carefully weigh a licensing program's administrative
costs against the burden on ethical, competent, nonattorney
debt adjusters whom the state would force out of business. A
regulatory scheme tailored to problems of debt adjustment
might have reduced underinclusiveness and provided more
careful checks on abuse.
168. The balancing process advocated here is similar to, but analytically
distinguishable from, balancing processes that legislatures might use to enforce other constitutional norms. For instance, the state might prohibit a
homeowner whose lot is situated just below a unique scenic overlook from erecting a vista-blocking second story. Such state action appears to meet the
tests set forth here for conformance with equality norms. The goal of protecting a unique resource for the public is legitimate and seems to outweigh any
diminution of property value suffered by the homeowner. No misclassification
exists because, by definition, no other homeowner can be similarly situated
with one whose home is situated below a unique overlook. Finally, a requirement that the homeowner not build in such a way as to obstruct the view
seems perfectly tailored to fit the state's goal of preserving the scenic overlook.
The propriety of imposing on a single homeowner the full cost of preserving a scenic benefit for the public does not involve equality norms, but rather
implicates the fifth amendment's taking clause. A determination of whether
such a regulatory action constitutes a taking requiring compensation is not
controlled by a precise rule and would require a court to weigh public and private interests. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (scenic zoning). A court is not likely to find a taking here because the prohibition clearly
advances "legitimate state interests," id. at 260 (citing Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)), and does not deny the homeowner an "economically viable use of his land." Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978)). To the extent these rulings reflect
the Court's institutional concerns, a legislature should give closer consideration to homeowners' rights in its own deliberations. See supra note 136.
169. Another possible justification for the statute is the economic protection of lawyers. This purpose would satisfy equality norms if it was asserted
openly and justified by a perceived need to increase the incomes of Kansas bar
members. Although such a justification would meet equality norms, the legislature should, perhaps, reconsider the means chosen-putting debt adjusters
out of business-in favor of alternatives such as tax subsidies or state-imposed
exhorbitant fees. If this purpose was held secretly and if few or none of the
Kansas legislators sincerely believed that enriching attorneys was sound public
policy, the purpose would be illegitimate and the legislation should be
opposed.
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FINAL OBLIGATION: REVISING OBSOLETE LEGISLATION

The courts will uphold a law under the rational basis test
unless it is so clearly obsolete that no real or hypothetical basis
justifies its continued existence. 170 Legislators, on the other
hand, have an obligation to revise or repeal a law when
changed circumstances render its original purpose invalid.171
Through legislative committees or law revision commissions,
legislatures should continually review statutes in force, subjecting them to the constitutional analysis proposed above for
pending legislation. 172 This review would identify statutes
designed to address problems that required far-reaching solutions years ago-despite harm to a misclassified group-but
that no longer justified the same measures. Renewed analysis
of the subject or even modern technology may suggest less restrictive alternatives to replace such laws. Legislatures should
amend or appeal those statutes now on the books that fail to
pass muster.
If legislators scrutinize all pending bills in this manner,
and periodically subject existing statutes to similar scrutiny,
they will go a long way toward fulfilling their constitutional
duty to enforce the equal protection guarantee. It remains to
consider obstacles that may hinder implementation of this
scheme.
170. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979). In Barry the Supreme
Court upheld a New York statute authorizing the automatic suspension of a
harness-racing trainer if his horse tested positively for drugs. Id. at 68. A
harness-racing trainer claimed that the law denied him equal protection because thoroughbred-racing trainers could stay suspension pending administrative appeals. Id. at 62. The Court held that although the state legislature had
passed the statute in 1954 following disclosures of widespread abuse in the harness-racing industry, New York did not have to justify the distinction in 1979.
See id. at 67 & n.12, 68 (refusing to require "current empirical proof").
171. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5-6

(1982) (laws represent the majority when passed but soon stop serving current
needs or representing current majorities).
172. This periodic review should not be particularly onerous for the legislature and might be a sound policy choice for reasons other than protection of
equality. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2351-79 (1978) (providing for orderly review and termination of agencies and statutes); FLA. STAT. § 11.61
(West Supp. 1987) (providing for automatic "sunset" of various state regulatory
laws after a fixed period of time if not reenacted by the legislature). But see
G. CALABREsr, supra note 171, at 61-62 (automatic sunset laws permit opponents of desirable regulation to obtain force of inertia to block reenactment of
legislation still desired by a passive majority). The legislature could ease its
burden by delegating the review function to commissions that would make
recommendations concerning obsolete legislation.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:311

V. IMPLEMENTING THE LEGISLATIVE ROLE
A.

DISTINGUISHING CONSTITUTIONAL AND
CONScIENTIoUS LAWMAKING

Conscientious legislators, analyzing pending legislation,
make inquiries similar to the three described above.' 7 3 The legislature undoubtedly rejects most bills that misclassify unnecessarily, serve illegitimate purposes, constitute bad policies, or
appear politically unwise. Similarly, most successful legislation
implicitly satisfies these proposed constitutional standards because it is carefully tailored to achieve a valid purpose. Nevertheless, a conscientious legislator might act differently in some
situations if not bound by the constitutional requirements of
the equal protection clause. Moreover, a constitutionally motivated legislature might engage in a variety of procedural actions that it would not consider, absent a binding constitutional
norm.
For instance, if legislators used the legitimacy of a bill's
purpose to analyze constitutionality, many popular legislative
goals might be constitutionally impermissible. Absent an independent constitutional mandate, conscientious legislators
might agree to adopt a proposal with a constitutionally impermissible but attractive goal, knowing that if it is challenged in
court, a creative lawyer could devise a legitimate purpose for
the proposal.
A conscientious legislator, unencumbered by constitutional
concerns, may still weigh a bill's costs and benefits and evaluate
the fit between its ends and means, as required in an equal protection inquiry. The equal protection inquiry, however, requires legislators to consider the bill's impact on the entire
jurisdiction. Conscientious legislators unencumbered by equal
protection considerations are likely to focus solely on their own
districts' needs and concerns.
Finally, political theorists have debated whether conscientious legislators in a representative democracy should vote consistent with the will of their constituency, even if their
conscience suggests otherwise. 174 Allegiance to the Constitution mandates that legislators oppose legislation that denies citizens the equal protection of the laws. 75 Although proposed
173. See supra text accompanying notes 147-69.
174. See H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 216 (1972); G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 175, 178-80, 189-96
(1969).
175. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 52, at 350 ("[L]egislative submis-
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legislation might solve a severe problem in some legislators'
districts, the constitutional norm of equality demands that the
legislature consider the adverse consequences on those whose
votes do not control a majority of legislative districts.
The focused approach of the inquiries themselves illustrates another difference between consitutional and conscientious analysis. While both types of lawmaking may compel
legislatures to enact procedures to facilitate analysis and aid in
decision making, only constitutional lawmaking provides a
ready structure. This procedural structure is discussed in detail
76
below.'

B. THE BENEFITS TO LEGISLATORS WHO ENFORCE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
While in a perfect world the expanded role of the legislature as proposed in this Article would be readily and flawlessly
executed, inherent imperfections in the political process inevitably lead legislators to violate constitutional guarantees. Indeed, these imperfections serve as the principal justification for
judicial review of legislative acts.177 The prevailing model of
the legislative process, the pressure theory, hypothesizes that
special interest groups all vie for particular favors that will
place one group above another. 178 Professors Tussman and tenBroek argued in their seminal equal protection work that "the
pressure theory of legislation and the equal protection requirement are incompatible."' 17 9 Thus legislators are not likely to
achieve more than marginal improvement in constitutional decision making.
The improvement, although marginal, could be significant.
Legislators may develop a greater sense of responsibility if they
recognize that the courts will not meaningfully review most of
their equal protection evaluations. Furthermore, express legission to political pressure does not constitute a fair reason for failure to extend
the operation of a law to those similarly situated whom it leaves untouched.").
176. See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (Heirloom ed.
1966).
178. See, e.g., D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 353 (2d ed. 1971).
According to Professor Ackerman, this theory describes the legislative process
that the framers expected to prevail. Ackerman, The StorrsLectures: Discovering the Constitution,93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 (1984).
179. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 52, at 350. But see THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 83 (J. Madison) (Heirloom ed. 1966) (Constitution designed to allow
various factions to proliferate so they will cancel each other out, making it
more difficult to advance special interests).
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lative acceptance of equality norms might lead to procedural reforms that, as a practical matter, reduce the amount of
legislation inconsistent with those norms. Finally, because success in defeating legislation can be politically rewarding, a constitutional arrow becomes a useful addition to a legislator's
quiver.
1.

Increased Sense of Responsibility

As noted above, legislative refusal to make independent
constitutional determinations in areas of judicial underenforcement conflicts with the legislator's role in a constitutional system of government. 80° Fortunately, history suggests that
Congress recognizes issues that invoke judicial deference and,
in cases involving such issues, takes its constitutional role more
seriously. To illustrate, in deliberating on the Reorganization
Act of 1945, Congress grappled with the constitutionality of a
one-house veto of a presidential reorganization plan. One Senator attributed Congress's close attention to the constitutional issue to the prevailing belief that the Supreme Court would view
the Act's constitutionality as a political question.18 1 Similarly,
serious discussion of constitutional issues marked the 1970 debate over Congress's power to lower the voting age to eighteen
18 2
by statute, rather than through constitutional amendment.
In contrast, the same Ninety-First Congress gave considerably
less attention to the constitutionality of criminal law legislation
authorizing detention prior to trial, which was destined for
close judicial scrutiny.183 Judge Mikva, a member of that Congress, attributed the difference to judicial doctrines of nonjusticiability: "Congress could accept more gracefully and deal
more maturely with self-imposed restraints on the exercise of
its power than with restraints imposed or enforced by a coordinate branch of government. '184 These illustrations suggest that
180. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
181. 91 CONG. REC. 10,269 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Murdock). Of course,
that Senator Murdock's prediction proved incorrect almost 40 years later, see
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (legislative veto unconstitutional), does
not alter the behavioral effect of Congress's perception that an issue is
nonjusticiable.
182. See Mikva & Lundy, supra note 64, at 483-85 (commending the "full,
fair and enlightened nature of the constitutional debate").
183. See id. at 474 (preventive detention debate showed that "highly
charged, emotional situations make it virtually impossible to bring to bear convincing constitutional argumentation" in the legislature). Consideration in the
House was particularly deficient in this respect. Id. at 473.
184. Id. at 484. Thayer, criticizing judicial activism, complained that when

1987]

LEGISLATIVE EQUAL PROTECTION

the removal of judicial review enhances constitutional scrutiny
during the legislative process.1 8 5
2.

Procedural Changes

The equality norm, as an abstract concept of constitutional
theory, is not controversial. Constitutional lawmaking is similar to the type of conscientious lawmaking that all legislators
would claim to support. 18 6 The problem is ensuring that legislators apply abstract equality norms to specific legislation that
may unfairly benefit their constituents or the constituents of
colleagues to whom they owe favors. If persuaded that the
Constitution mandates application of abstract equality norms,
however, legislators will be more likely to promulgate and enforce procedures that improve constitutional lawmaking.
Existing legislative institutions are readily available to facilitate constitutional decision making. Professional legislative
staffs, for example, can perform the requisite constitutional
analysis by measuring the extent to which proposed bills result
in misclassification and analyzing alternative approaches. 87
Rigorous staff analysis would be particularly helpful in states
with part-time legislators, who may meet as few as thirty days
in a year.18 8 Without a constitutional mandate, however, those
states might forego such staffing as a luxury.
Legislators may initiate constitutional scrutiny themselves
through committee hearings.18 9 These hearings provide an opexternal restraints are imposed on the legislature, "the people . . . lose the
political experience, and the moral education and political stimulus that comes
from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own
errors." J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106 (7th ed. 1974).
185. For this reason courts sustaining legislative classifications against
equal protection attack must clarify whether the decision is based on institutional deference to the legislature or on approval of the substantive aspects of
the legislation. If courts eliminate confusion created by opinions applying the
rational basis test, legislatures will be more likely to understand and to perform their constitutional obligations.
186. See supra text accompanying note 173.
187. See Balutis, Legislative Staffing: Does it Make a Difference?, in LEGISLATIVE REFORM AND PUBLIC POLICY 141 (1977) (staff improves quality of legislation by providing accurate information "carefully analyzed from the
legislative perspective").
188. Id. at 137; see, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
189. See Cohen, Hearing on a Bill: LegislativeFolklore?, 37 MINN. L. REv.
34, 35-36 (1952) (hearing is only opportunity for Congress to "check on the accuracy of the fact situations, the plausibility of the means-end hypothesis, and
the efficacy of the instrumental value judgments which underlie each of
them"); Mikva & Lundy, supra note 64, at 458 (most thorough study of constitutional problems in legislation takes place in committees); see also D. MOR-
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portunity to investigate the true purpose of a proponent's bill.
Committee members often have greater expertise in the subject
area than other legislators and thus can better discern whether
the bill's alleged purpose is a sham. Committee members are
also better able, because of their expertise, to determine
whether the problem addressed by the bill is as serious as the
proponents suggest and whether the means chosen are the
most appropriate. Other legislators, aware of this expertise,
often defer to the committee when close constitutional questions arise. 90
Given this expertise and the resulting deference, commitGAN, supra note 10, at 351-57 (committees are appropriate arena for
consideration of constitutional problems because senators and representatives
rely on them for advice).
190. See Mikva & Lundy, supra note 64, at 458 (nonlawyers tend to resolve
constitutional arguments "not by force of logic, but by the weight of numbers,
or by an overwhelming presumption in favor of the Committee majority"); id.
at 463 (if preventive detention bill came out of Judiciary Committee of either
house, "it was virtually certain that the lawyers on those committees had resolved any doubts about the proposal's constitutionality"). But cf. D. MORGAN,
supra note 10, at 134 (inadequate consideration of constitutional issues surrounding 1862 loyalty oath legislation caused in part by excessive reliance on
Judiciary Committees).
In the course of making constitutional determinations, Congress has periodically debated the need to refer legislation to the Judiciary Committee for
special consideration of constitutional issues. During consideration of the 1863
Greenback Act, for instance, Representative Noell responded to a constitutional challenge by offering an amendment to refer the constitutional issues to
the Committee on the Judiciary. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1117
(1863). The House ignored the amendment. See id. at 1147. In 1890, however,
the Senate did refer the Sherman Act to the Judiciary Committee, even
though it had previously rejected such a motion for fear that the Committee
would table the legislation. 21 CONG. REc. 2608, 2731 (1890).
Concerns that the Judiciary Committee will shelve legislation supported
by a majority of the body suggest a need to ensure that committees which deliberate about constitutional issues are representative of the entire body. D.
MORGAN, supra note 10, at 32-33, 65, 290, 353. The unrepresentative makeup of
the Senate Judiciary Committee resulted in a series of parliamentary maneuvers that kept the Committee-dominated by civil rights foes-from considering the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 320. Concerns can also be alleviated by
a joint motion by the majority and minority floor leaders (who, in practice,
seek unanimous consent before making such a motion) to refer a bill to committee for a limited time period only. See Senate Rule XVII 3, reprintedin
SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1984).
The Judiciary Committee can appropriately consider the general nature of
equality norms to be used when a bill is challenged on fourteenth amendment
grounds. If Congress adopted tests similar to those advocated in this Article,
however, it would not need to refer each piece of legislation to the Committee.
The legitimate purpose, cost-benefit, and means-end tests proposed above are
within the competence of the committees that have subject matter jurisdiction
over the legislation.
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tee members must articulate fully the value judgments and factual analysis underlying their determination that a bill is
constitutional. Staff reports presented to committees or to the
full membership' 91 or committee reports presented on the floor
should include a systematic analysis of relevant constitutional
inquiries. Full disclosure may prevent legislators with less expertise in the subject area from unconstitutionally supporting
the bill or its alternatives without being cognizant of the bill's
purpose.
Objective facts and reasoning in committee or staff reports
supply legislators with sound reasons to oppose unconstitutional legislation. Legislators can greatly benefit from such
data because of the practical functioning of the legislative process. Although legislation must have an author, it need not
have an opponent. Legislators, as a practical matter, expect to
be given the benefit of the doubt (at least by their friends)
when sponsoring legislation. Hence, legislators hesitate to oppose a colleague's bill unless they have sufficient reasons to do
so. 1 92 If a committee has concluded that the bill contravenes
equality norms, a legislator is provided with an airtight reason
for rejecting a bill-one based on the Constitution.
During deliberations, floor procedural rules should permit
legislators to raise points of order against any bill, or any section of a bill, on the ground that it violates the Constitution. 193
Under these rules members should independently determine
the constitutionality of the challenged provision. To further
this goal, they should be given an opportunity to vote on consti191. Preferably a research unit for the entire legislature or staffs affiliated
with party caucuses would prepare separate floor analyses. This procedure
prevents a committee chair and staff from monopolizing available information.
W. MUIR, LEGISLATURE: CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOL FOR POLITICS 130-33 (1982). But
cf. J. VAN DER SLIK & K. REDFIELD, LAWMAKING IN ILLINOIS 109 (1986) (staff
controlled by party leaders).
192. W. Mui, supra note 191, at 42-43.
193. The United States Senate's rules permit constitutional points of order
against any pending matter. The United States House of Representatives's
rules do not provide for constitutional points of order apart from consideration
of the merits. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. Many state legislatures incorporate Robert's Rules of Orderinto their rules of procedure, providing they are not inconsistent with rules adopted by the house in question.
See, e.g., Illinois Senate Rule 51, reprinted in EIGHTY-FOURTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HANDBOOK OF THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE 89 (1985). Robert's Rules
proscribe motions that conflict with the United States Constitution. H. RoBERT, ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER NEWLY REVISED § 38, at 291 (S. Robert ed.
1970).
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tutional issues apart from the merits of a proposal. 194 Inevitably, many members permit their views on the merits of a bill to
dictate their votes on constitutionality, 195 but a process
designed to separate merits from constitutionality would diminish this tendency 96 A separate vote on constitutionality permits legislators, as a political move, to proclaim continued
fidelity to the policies underlying an unconstitutional proposal
while explaining that their constitutional obligations forced
194. D. MORGAN, supra note 10, at 33 (members must "detach constitutional questions from the policy framework" to achieve a satisfactory
settlement).
195. Legislators who oppose a bill on the merits are likely to embrace arguments against its constitutionality, while those who agree strongly with the
merits are not likely to change their votes because of doubts about constitutionality. This effect is most pronounced with emotionally charged issues. See
supra note 183. To illustrate, the Senate in 1985 considered an amendment to
an appropriations bill that restricted abortion funding for prison inmates.
Equally divided on a motion to table, the Senate declined to defeat the amendment on the merits. 131 CONG. REc. S14,062-63 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1985). They
then disposed of the amendment using a constitutional point of order. Just
prior to sustaining the constitutional point of order by voice vote, the Senate
defeated by one vote (48-47) a motion to table the point of order. 131 CONG.
REC. S14,632-33 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1985). Even though the vote on the motion
to table represented a vote on the merits and the point of order vote supposedly involved constitutionality, of the Senators participating in both votes, only
two (Roth and Chiles) switched their votes between the two motions. See 131
CONG. REC. S14,062-63 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1985); 131 CONG. REC. S14,632-33
(daily ed. Nov. 1, 1985).
196. For example, in 1874 members of the House of Representatives effectively separated constitutionality from the merits when considering a Senate
bill that required banks receiving United States currency to pay a charge.
Although the bill's proponents argued that this fee was not a tax, Representative Garfield disagreed and raised a point of order, contending that the bill
would raise revenue in violation of the origination clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 7, cl. 1. 2 CONG. REC. 3076 (1874) (remarks of Rep. Garfield). By a vote of
56-179, the House rejected Garfield's contention. Id. at 3077. The bill then
passed by a much narrower vote, 140-102. Id. at 3078. Thus, a substantial
number of representatives who opposed the bill on the merits voted with the
bill's proponents on the constitutional issue.
A more recent example occurred in 1984 during Senate consideration of
legislation giving the president veto power over individual line items of appropriations bills. The Senate overwhelmingly sustained a point of order that the
proposal violated the presentment clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 12. 130
CONG. REC. S5323 (daily ed. May 3, 1984). The next year a similar proposal
was narrowly defeated when the Senate failed by one vote to end a filibuster.
131 CONG. REC. S9942 (daily ed. Jul. 24, 1985). Eighteen Senators voted on the
merits to block the filibuster even though they had previously sustained the
constitutional point of order. See id.; 130 CONG. REC. S5323 (daily ed. May 3,
1984). Interestingly, 6 of the 18 (Biden, Hatch, Heflin, Kennedy, Leahy, and
Simpson) were Judiciary Committee members. CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY
FOR THE 99TH CONGRESS 288 (1985).
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them to sustain the point of order. 197
To facilitate constitutional decision making, the United
States House of Representatives and state legislatures should
conform to the United States Senate rules permitting points 19of8
order on constitutional grounds against any pending matter.
Further, parliamentary rules should not permit a waiver of
constitutional points of order. 99 In the Senate the presiding officer does not have to rule on the point of order but may submit
it directly to the entire Senate for full debate.200 Unfortu197. Suppose a legislator supports the merits of a particular bill but concludes after careful analysis that the bill is unconstitutional. This Article asserts that the legislator would be constitutionally obligated to vote to sustain a
point of order against the bill. But suppose a majority of the legislative body
disagrees on the constitutional issue and overrules the point of order. Is the
legislator now free to vote on the political merits of the legislation? In such a
case, the legislator would have to balance the harm of supporting legislation
she believes to be unconstitutional against the orderly process of the legislature, which has duly considered and rejected the constitutional point. The legislator should consider the degree of confidence she has in her constitutional
decision, the potential harm to our constitutional system or to those protected
by the constitutional provision being violated if the legislation passes, and the
effect on the legislative process of continuing to vote based on constitutional
doctrine. An analogous situation arises when a Supreme Court Justice believes that particular conduct is unconstitutional but prior court precedent
supports its constitutionality.
198. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 42,632 (1971) (Senate rejected point of order
that public financing of presidential election campaigns violated article I,
which bars expenditures except through appropriations statutes); 104 CONG.
REC. 12,602-07, 12,611-12 (1958) (Senate rejected point of order that provision
of proposed Constitution of Alaska violated seventeenth amendment, which
governs "the manner and terms for the election of United States Senators");
id. at 12,454-59, 12,464-72 (1958) (Senate rejected point of order that Alaska
statehood bill did not meet constitutional requirements of equality in article
IV for admission to the Union.).
199. The United States House of Representatives has a procedure which
permits waiver of all points of order against legislation by a resolution reported from the Committee on Rules. See generally L. DESCHLER, DESCHLER'S
PROCEDURE, ch. 31, § 7 (1975). State legislative rules typically allow for rules
to be suspended by a vote of a specified majority. See, e.g., Illinois Senate Rule
30, reprintedin EIGHTY-FOURTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HANDBOOK OF THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE 75-76 (1985). If constitutional points of order are to have
any procedural significance, a legislature's rules cannot allow its members to
waive such points of order. As Representative Yates argued in unsuccessfully
pressing a constitutional point of order under existing House rules, while the
"waiver of points of order might apply to ordinary legislation, it cannot apply
to a waiver of the constitutional provisions, because the Committee on Rules
cannot waive any constitutional provisions." 119 CONG. REc. 15,290 (1968).
200. See, e.g., SEN. Doc. No. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1984); see also 124
CONG. REc. 27,249-59 (1978) (tabling point of order that proposed constitutional
amendment permitting Senate representation for the District of Columbia violated article V by affecting equal suffrage of states within the Senate); 113
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nately, the House of Representatives's rules, precedents, and
present procedural mechanisms do not generally permit constitutional points of order to be considered apart from the merits
of the legislative proposal. 20 1 Members of the House are expected to consider the constitutional issue when voting on the
20 2
merits of the proposal.
CONG. REC. 26,823 (1967) (challenging Economic Opportunity Act originating
in Senate as unconstitutionally raising revenue); 112 CONG. REC. 13,548-49
(1966) (tabling point of order that Internal Revenue Code amendment concerning deductions for political contributions constituted revenue measure
which could not originate in the Senate); 108 CONG. REC. 5083-87 (1962) (tabling point of order challenging establishment of national monument by resolution rather than by legislation presented to the President); 76 CONG. REC.
627 (1932) (challenging as revenue-raising a tariff amendment to Senate bill
granting independence to the Phillipines); 66 CONG. REC. 2344-55, 2358, 2273-74
(1925) (challenging as revenue-raising the reclassification of postal salaries).
201. The House will sometimes consider an objection that legislation allegedly violates the origination clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 1, which requires
that all bills for raising revenue originate in the House. The House will consider such arguments, however, not because of the constitutional problems
raised, but because a Senate-initiated revenue measure will affect the "privilege and prerogative" of the House. See, e.g., 2 CONG. REC. 3076 (1874) (ruling
of the Speaker). Senate action violating the origination clause may be rejected
by House resolution and the bill returned to the Senate. See, e.g., 114 CONG.
REC. 17,970-78 (1968) (House tabled resolution returning Senate amendment to
the Senate with explanation that amendment violated origination clause); 34
CONG. REC. 2261 (1901) (remarks of Rep. Bailey).
202. In 1878 the House considered a motion to suspend the rules and pass
internal improvements legislation. (This parliamentary maneuver allows bills
with strong support to be considered quickly without amendment and passed
by a vote of two-thirds of the members. See A. MIKVA & P. SARIS, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 235 (1983).) Representative Cox objected to the measure on
constitutional grounds. Characterizing the authorized projects as "local improvements to inconsiderable rivers and creeks," he believed that funding
these projects would exceed Congress's power under the commerce clause. 7
CONG. REC. 2713 (1878). In rebuttal Representative Reagan, the bill's sponsor,
argued that a "point of order is an objection to the bill; it cannot lie against a
motion to suspend the rules." Id. The Speaker refused to sustain the point of
order. Id. at 2716.
On several occasions the House has refused to listen to members' points of
order that Senate-initiated measures violated the origination clause. In overruling such a point of order in 1859, for example, the Speaker noted that he
would have "nothing to do with the question, whether the amendment is in
order, or constitutional, or not. That is a question for the House to determine
by their votes." CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 1680 (1859).
The House tradition of melding constitutional and substantive issues was
explained in 1901 in the course of a ruling on another origination clause point
of order. Representative Payne, Chair of the Ways & Means Committee and
the bill's sponsor, stated:
The question of constitutionality is a question addressed to the conscience of each member, and his interpretation of it, and he decides
whether the provision or amendment comes within the Constitution
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Political Uses of Constitutional Arguments

Suppose Senator A serves on a committee considering legislation regulating optical sales similar to that adopted by the
Oklahoma legislature and upheld by the Supreme Court in
Williamson v. Lee Optical.20 3 If no factual basis exists 20 4 for
imposing a greater burden on opticians than on providers of
ready-to-wear glasses, the Senator is constitutionally required
either to oppose the bill or to extend the prescription requirement to all eyeglass providers. Moreover, this opposition may
be politically advantageous, if, for example, a major chain of optical stores is headquartered in Senator A's district.
Armed with constitutional arguments, ,the Senator can demand a record that justifies the exemption for sales of ready-towear eyeglasses. By urging the committee to adhere to its constitutional mandate, Senator A may prevail on a majority or the
Chair to schedule additional hearings to educate members
about the legislation and, of course, cause delay.20 5 Once a recaccording to his judgment in voting for the bill.... [A] point of order
of this kind can never obtain against any proposition in the House.

34 CoNG. REc. 2260 (1901). The ranking minority member of the Ways &
Means Committee, Representative Richardson, explained that a member "can
not make a question as to the constitutionality of an act ....
It mightbe unconstitutional and yet be within our parliamentary rule, and it might be unparliamentary and yet be constitutional." Id.; see also 119 CoNG. REc. 15,290-91
(1968) (rejecting point of order that transfer of funds to permit continued air
strikes in Cambodia was unconstitutional absent congressional declaration of
war or other congressional approval); 94 CONG. REc. 5817 (1948) (in rejecting
point of order that amendment constituted ex post facto legislation, Chair held
that "the House does not pass on questions of constitutionality"); 93 CONG.
REc. 9522-23 (1947) (in rejecting point of order that legislation abolishing poll
tax in federal elections violated article I, Speaker ruled that "[i]t is not within
the jurisdiction of the Chair to determine what is constitutional and what is
not constitutional").
203. 348 U.S. 483 (1955); see supra text accompanying notes 132-37.
204. Unlike courts, legislative fact-finding is not limited to the evidence
presented in formal proceedings. Although committee hearings provide an effective and useful means of securing relevant facts, legislators are also allowed
to draw from experiences of their own or of others. In the case of economic
regulation, the various competing interests probably should present their evidence in public so it can be reviewed in an orderly marketplace of ideas. On
the other hand, if a nearsighted legislator wishes to rely on personal experience to judge the similarity between ready-to-wear and prescription glasses,
and his colleague prefers to rely on the opinion of his brother who is an eye
doctor, they are free to do so. This Article's thesis requires only that legislators actually believe a distinction in fact exists before enacting a distinction in
law.
205. In the United States Senate, for example, unlimited floor debate remains a key aspect of legislative strategy, and any delay aids the opposition.
In many state legislatures, the sessions are quite short, and the need for thor-
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ord is developed, the constitutional argument may help gain
support for an amendment repealing the exemption for readyto-wear eyeglasses. Such an amendment would presumably
arouse the opposition of retailers who sell such glasses, thereby
jeopardizing passage of the entire bill.
Strategic use of the constitutional point of order can be an
important tactic in defeating legislation containing unconstitutional classifications if floor rules do not strictly limit legislative floor debate. For instance, a United States senator can
bring a point of order early during the floor debate. If it is sustained, the legislation falls with a minimal expenditure of time
and effort. If overruled, the senator still may attempt to defeat
the bill through extended debate or other parliamentary tactics.
These tactics, however, can be time-consuming and detract
from other responsibilities. A busy legislator does not want to
expend time and effort, or risk antagonizing a colleague, by opposing legislation that is ultimately not adopted. As a result,
opponents to the legislation often do not mobilize support until
the bill's proponents, or the lobbyists supporting the legislation,
have secured commitments from other members. Constitutional objections give the bill's opponents a renewed opportunity to lobby colleagues, especially those whose commitments
in favor of the bill are weak or founded on scanty information.
These legislators can write constituents who support the bill,
proclaiming their support for the cause but advocating that the
legislation be redrafted to meet constitutional concerns.
Although legislation with a proper basis can be objectionable if passed to accomplish an impermissible purpose, defeating
bad legislation for base political reasons is never improper. In
the former case, legislators acting in conformance with their
constitutional obligations would defeat the bill because of its
wrongful purposes. In the latter case, the bill would be defeated regardless of the legislators' motivation. Although some
may question the use of constitutional arguments to gain tactical advantages, it nevertheless prevents legislatures from enacting unconstitutional statutes. Given the advantages that
constitutional objections provide to opponents of a bill, opponents can be expected to use them to that end. Those genuinely concerned about equality norms may subsequently use
these precedents motivated by politics, rather than constituough hearings may result in a bill being condemned to consideration during
the period between sessions. This delay gives foes time to solidify their opposition and diffuses any momentum in favor of the legislation.
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tional law, to defeat legislation that otherwise would secure
easy passage. In the real world of politics, such a marginal improvement should be commended.
CONCLUSION
In considering equal protection challenges, the judiciary
has underenforced constitutional rights because of institutional
limitations. Congress, using its powers under section five of
the fourteenth amendment, should protect equality norms that
the courts are unable to secure. In compelling cases groups currently subject to hostile treatment in state legislatures should
be given the protection of heightened judicial scrutiny. Congress should also direct courts or specialized agencies to carefully review facially neutral classifications that disproportionately harm racial minorities but lack discriminatory intent. In other cases Congress should recognize that, although
strict judicial scrutiny is unwarranted, the rational basis test is
inadequate to guarantee that people similarly circumstanced
are treated alike. As a result, Congress should authorize judicial balancing of the state's goal and the classification used to
achieve that goal. Finally, Congress could conduct its own investigations and invalidate state laws that pervasively fail to
treat similarly situated citizens fairly.
In addition to these prescriptive measures, state and federal legislators must consider whether debated bills provide
equal treatment to persons who are similarly situated, not
merely whether the bill might survive some deferential form of
judicial scrutiny. Individual legislators should determine from
debating proposed legislation whether the bill's true purpose is
legitimate, whether the resulting public benefit outweighs the
harm to those it misclassifies, and whether less restrictive alternatives are available.
History suggests that legislators act more responsibly in enforcing and abiding by the mandate of the equal protection
clause if aware that the courts will defer to them in reviewing
statutory classifications. If legislatures implement the procedural changes advocated above, they should see the political, as
well as constitutional, benefits of more effectively assuring fair
and equal treatment for their constituents.

